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ABSTRACT
Impact of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Rate Increase on Marketing Spending and
Cross-State Substitution
by
Mikael B. Ahlgren
Dr. Sarah Tanford, Examination Chair
Assistant Professor Department of Hotel Management
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The purpose of this research was to investigate three potential consequences
related to the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring. The first section presents the
assessment of whether a higher tax rate motivated an Illinois casino operator to reduce of
marketing/promotional expenditures in an attempt to negatively influence revenues. The
second establishes if the surrounding state gaming operators reacted to the increased
Gaming Tax rate in Illinois, by raising their marketing spending. The last section clarifies
whether the changes to the Illinois Gaming Tax Schedule impacted gaming volumes in
the neighboring/competing states of Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri.
The analysis relied on data collected from three primary sources. The marketing
spend data was provided by a major Illinois riverboat operator. The second analysis used
data from SEC filings to observe promotional expenditures by operator(s) competing for
gaming business with Illinois riverboats. The third analysis utilized data made available
by the state Gaming Control Boards and focused on how the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax
rate restructuring impacted gaming demand in the surrounding states.
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The findings reveal that the 2003 restructuring of the Gaming Tax in Illinois
impacted each area of interest, showing that promotional spending by a major Illinois
riverboat operator was significantly reduced, the promotional spending by a major
operator of commercial casinos in the surrounding states showed a statistically significant
increase in response to the increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax, and lastly, the gaming
demand in the three geographic areas located in the three bordering states was positively
impacted by the 2003 Gaming Tax increase in the state of Illinois.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The July 1, 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate increase represented the peak of a gradual
upward trend in gaming taxation that began when riverboat gaming was legalized in
1991. When riverboat gambling was first legalized, commercial gaming operators had
initially agreed to a flat tax rate of 20% of annual adjusted gross receipts (AGR) or
gaming win. When investigating gaming taxation policies it is noteworthy to
differentiate commercial casinos from other forms of casinos or gaming opportunities.
Commercial casinos are comprised of riverboat (often docked), land-based, and racetrack
casinos which are intended to be operated for commercial means. State regulators often
draw distinctions between these aforementioned types of gaming operations (Anderson,
2005).
The commercial gaming tax rate initially began the upward trend in 1998 when
Illinois decided to transition from the flat tax to a graduated rate that set the gaming tax
for the lowest tier at 15% of AGR up to $25 million in gaming win which stepped up to
35% of AGR in the highest tier. The tax receipts were further supplemented with a $2
dollar admission fee that was split between the state and the local government serving as
the hosting jurisdiction. The next major increase occurred in 2002 when the top tier was
increased to 50% of AGR and the admissions tax increased to $3 dollars. A detailed
summary can be seen in Table 1.
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Table 1
1999 – 2005 Illinois Gaming Tax Rates and Admission Tax
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Note.

Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 35% of gross gaming revenue,$2 per patron
admissions tax
Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 35% of gross gaming revenue,$2 per patron
admissions tax
Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 35% of gross gaming revenue,$2 per patron
admissions tax
Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 50% (Maximum tax rate through June 2002
35%) of gross gaming revenue,$3 per patron admissions tax
Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 70% of gross gaming revenue,$3-$5 per
patron admissions tax
Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 70% of gross gaming revenue,$3-$5 per
patron admissions tax
Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 50% of gross gaming revenue,$2-$3 per
patron admissions tax
Gaming Taxation Rates were retrieved from Illinois Gaming Commission Annual

Reports from 1999 to 2005. Retrieved January 15, 2010 from
http://www.igb.illinois.gov/annualreport/.
The casino industry vociferously objected to the 2003 Illinois changes, in part arguing
that the state erroneously believed that the gaming industry was immune to generally
accepted economic laws. The gaming industry’s stakeholders have long argued that
lawmakers consider increasing gaming taxes a safe target in an effort to generate state
revenues. Gaming’s advocates point to what they believe is a general misconception that
the industry is hyper profitable compared to other businesses and are capable of paying
whatever is necessary to balance state budgets (Christiansen, 2005).
Regardless of the industry protest, the top tier of the Illinois Gaming Tax rate was
increased to 70% on July 1, 2003. All other gaming tax rate tiers, with exception of the
lowest, were also increased by 5 to 7.5%. In addition, the schedule determining the
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applicable tax tier to be paid by a commercial riverboat casino was shifted to the state’s
favor. Casinos with the same adjusted gross revenue could both shift to a higher tier
which furthermore had an upwards adjusted rate. For example, a riverboat with adjusted
gross revenues of just over $25 million dollars would pay a gaming tax of 27.5% of AGR
in 2003 compared to the 22.5% of AGR that the same boat would have paid in prior to
the increase.
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Table 2
Overview of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Increase

Gaming Tax
Rate as
percentage of
Adjusted Gross
Receipts or
Gaming Win

Admissions Tax

2002 Illinois Gaming Tax Rate
& Admissions Tax
15% of AGR up to and including
$25 million
22.5% of AGR in excess of $25
million but not exceeding $50
million
27.5% of AGR in excess of $50
million but not exceeding $75
million
32.5% of AGR in excess of $75
million but not exceeding
$100 million
37.5% of AGR in excess of $100
million but not exceeding
$150 million
45% of the AGR in excess of
$150 million but not
exceeding $200 million
50%of AGR in excess of $200
million
$3 per patron admissions tax

2003 (post July 1) Illinois Gaming
Tax rate & Admissions Tax
15% of AGR up to and including
$25 million
27.5% of AGR in excess of $25
million but not exceeding $37.5
million
32.5% of AGR in excess of $37.5
million but not exceeding $50
million
37.5% of AGR in excess of $50
million but not exceeding $75
million
45% of AGR in excess of $75
million but not exceeding $100
million
50% of the AGR in excess of $100
million but not exceeding $250
million
70% of AGR in excess of $250
million

$3 per patron for licensees that
admitted fewer than one million
persons in the previous calendar
year.
$4 per patron for licensees that
admitted more than one million
persons but fewer than 2.3
million persons in the previous
calendar year.
$5 per patron for licensees that
admitted more than 2.3 million
persons in the previous calendar
year.
Note. Gaming Taxation Rates were retrieved from Illinois Gaming Commission Annual
Reports from 2003. Retrieved January 15, 2010 from
http://www.igb.illinois.gov/annualreport/.
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Prior research into the increase in the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate revealed that the
policy change resulted in a decrease in gaming demand in the state of Illinois (Ahlgren,
Dalbor, & Singh, 2009). Having recognized a negative relationship between gaming
taxation and gaming demand as represented by coin-in, further investigation into the
mechanisms that produced the drop off in demand is warranted, as well as an expanded
analysis of the consequences related to the policy change.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the results and effects related to the
2003 gaming tax increase in Illinois. The primary focus is the attempt to understand a
potential direct driver of the decrease in gaming demand. Since casino patrons do not
pay the main gaming tax directly from their wallets, changes to their behavior must be
explained by other means. A potential explanation for the decrease in gaming demand is
that operators withhold or decrease their marketing/promotional expenditures when a tax
policy creates an incentive to reduce revenues.
An additional objective is to investigate whether the surrounding state gaming
operators reacted to the gaming tax rate increase in Illinois by increasing their marketing
budgets. This could have potentially occurred if operators recognized that Illinois
operators were scaling back on promotional and marketing budgets and thereby creating a
climate where competitors in neighboring states could develop programs meant to
encourage cross-state substitution.
A third objectivee of the research is to understand whether the changes to the Illinois
Gaming Tax schedule impacted gaming demand in the neighboring/competing states of
Iowa, Missouri, and Indiana. Riverboat casinos operating in competing states and in
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close proximity to Illinois operators impacted by the gaming tax increase might benefit
from increased economic pressure on Illinois riverboat casino operators and experience
an increase in demand.
Research Questions
1. What was the mechanism that directly impacted the behavior of Illinois gamblers?
a. Did Illinois riverboat operators change their promotional and comp
policies and marketing related expenditures in response to gaming tax rate
changes?
2. Did operators in surrounding states increase their marketing/promotional budgets
to attract Illinois customers?
3. Did the changes in gaming tax rates impact demand in states surrounding Illinois
and therefore potentially vying for the same customers?
a. If there was a cross-state impact, was it more pronounced at locations that
were closer in proximity to Illinois?
Overview
The Midwest commercial riverboat casino industry, since its inception in the 1990’s,
has been characterized by state to state competition for the gaming dollar. Riverboat
states have legalized commercial gaming in an attempt to capture the gaming taxes
generated by their own residents as well as attract cross-state gaming customers. Post
legalization, the riverboat states have adjusted regulations in an attempt to position their
operators more favorably and thereby providing a competitive advantage which should
logically lead to increased gaming demand and the inherent increased in gaming tax
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revenues. This suggests that at least at the state level, there is acknowledgement that
gaming has the potential to attract business across state lines.
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is arranged in to five chapters. The first chapter or the introduction
has introduced the topic or research, presented the research questions, and provided an
overview of the significance of the study. The second chapter includes an overview of
the subject area via a review of the related literature. Chapter 3 serves to explain the
research methodology and design, furthermore data sources will be identified as well as
the proposed statistical analysis. The fourth chapter presents the results of the statistical
analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the results, suggestions of
implications, and finally gives some guidance as to potential future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter begins with an overview of the U.S. commercial casino market and in
particular the Midwestern riverboat casinos. Secondly, prior research involving casino
regulation and taxation that relates to the Illinois Gaming Tax increase is presented. The
literature review also includes a section providing an overview of academic studies of
executive behavior and reactions to various economic pressures.
The U.S. commercial casino gaming industry constitutes the largest portion of the
commercial gaming market. A casino is typically distinguished by the offering of banked
games. The term “banked game” indicates that the casino is an active participant and
thereby has a stake in who wins or loses. Commercial casino gaming has developed into
multiple forms among which the most common is the Las Vegas-type casino, but also
includes excursion and permanently moored riverboats along with card rooms and
racinos (American Gaming Association, 2010). The term racino describes parimutual
racetracks that are permitted to offer casino-type gaming devices (Thalheimer, 2008). In
some cases the casino-type device refers to video lottery terminals and in other cases the
term refers to electronic gaming devices.
Reasons States Adopt Commercial Gaming
Furlong (1998) examined the question of what factors motivate states to adopt
legalized commercial casino gaming. Furlong determined that four themes repeatedly
surfaced to explain why states adopted gaming: Gaming tax revenues, political
feasibility, intra-state competitiveness, and local and state economic development.
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Furlong employed a cross-sectional analysis using a dichotomous variable to represent
the legalization or non-legalization of commercial casino gaming. The results of the
study suggested that states were most likely to legalize commercial gaming in order to
spur economic development and/or for reasons of political feasibility. Political feasibility
refers to the notion that gaming taxes may be preferable to other forms of taxation or
reductions in government services (Furlong, 1998).
Taxes raised from commercial gaming are often dedicated to either state or local
governments for particular purposes. Examples of these earmarks are: Michigan, which
directs 45% of casino taxation to the state school aid fund; Illinois, who funnels a portion
of collected gaming taxes to education and another portion to local governments serving
as host communities; and New Jersey, who directs funds collected through gaming
taxation to benefit the elderly and disabled. Most recipients receiving funds from gaming
taxation received the monies from the state’s general fund before gaming was legalized.
Advocates of commercial gaming’s legalization may endeavor to present doubtful or
vacillating voters the promise that commercial gaming will benefit worthy causes even if
the beneficiaries are generally unrelated to the industry (Anderson, 2005).
Calcagno, Walker, and Jackson (2010) sought to go beyond the four factors that
Furlong identified, to better understand why a state decides to legalize commercial casino
gaming. The researchers used a tobit model to weigh factors they determined were
appropriate. The authors reasoned that a tobit model was appropriate since two questions
needed to be considered. The first variables the researchers chose were adopted to
represent the state’s fiscal conditions and constraints that could conceivably motivate
legislators to legalize commercial gaming. These fiscal variables included short-term
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debt, long-term debt, state revenue per capita and per capita federal government transfers
to the state, along with a dummy variable that indicated whether the state in question had
a tax and expenditure limit.
Calcagno et al. (2010) also incorporated a dummy variable to examine the influence
of political alignment. The researchers focused on the state governor’s political
affiliation as well as whether the state was unified under either the Republican or
Democratic Party. Additionally, the study incorporated variables for intrastate gambling
competition. These variables included: dog betting, horse betting, lottery sales and
square footage of Native American casino gaming, which served as a proxy for tribal
gaming volume since Native American tribes are not required to disclose their revenue
data.
Besides exploring demographic variables which help to understand the
characteristics of the residents, the study integrated variables that attempted to measure
the impact of inter-state competition. The researchers examined the existence of border
rivers, whether bordering states host commercial gaming casinos and whether border
states host Native American tribal casinos. Finally, the study accounted for the size of
the state in an effort to control for the convenience factor involved in visiting a
neighboring state to engage in gaming activities. The study concluded that evidence
existed to support the notion that casinos are adopted in order to reduce fiscal pressures
particularly with regard to long term debt and current state revenues. In addition, the
findings suggested that keeping residents who wish to gamble in-state and attracting
tourist are both goals associated with the legalization of commercial casino gaming
(Calcagno et al., 2010).
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Expansion of Commercial Gaming
United States commercial casino gaming has expanded from Nevada to New Jersey,
the Gulf Coast, the Midwest “riverboat” states, and onward. Although differences in
regulatory structures designed to ensure the integrity of the industry are largely
superficial, significant variation exists with regard to the purported communal purpose
legal gaming brings to the individual state’s society and economy. Although a slight
generalization, the two approaches are often referred to as the “Nevada” model and the
“New Jersey” model (National Gambling Impact Study Commission [NGISC], 1999).
The “Nevada” model is distinguished by viewing commercial gaming as another
business with the recognition that a particular collection of safeguards are necessitated.
The “Nevada” model most significantly differs in that it suggests that the public purpose
of commercial gaming is to generate the greatest amount of economic benefits for the
state and its residents. These aforementioned benefits include jobs, investments, and tax
revenues. The governmental regulatory function is confined to the tasks of guarding the
integrity of the games and deterring organized crime (NGISC, 1999).
Nevada legalized casinos and other types of gaming in 1931. The industry was
distinguished by strong profits but suffered by its inability to raise financial capital
through mainstream debt and/or equity financing and therefore relied on more
questionable and creative sources of financing. This climate changed with the 1969
Corporate Gaming Act which permitted publically traded companies to hold gaming
licenses (Eadington, 1999).
Commercial gaming advocates suggest that Nevada serves as a “case study” in
structuring gaming tax rates that encourage economic development and generate a stream
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of benefits for the state (Christiansen, 2003). Nevada currently assesses the commercial
gaming industry with a graduated tax rate with a maximum tax of 6.75% on gross gaming
revenue, but also imposes added fees and levies that contribute approximately and
addition 1% to the overall gaming tax bill (American Gaming Association, 2010).
Gaming advocates further point out that the states with the lowest tax rates support the
highest number of gaming related jobs and maximize capital investment (Christiansen,
2005).
Furthermore, the “Nevada” model stresses providing the commercial gaming industry
with a comparatively free environment to react to the demands of the market, particularly
with respect to quantity of facilities and their location. The “Nevada” model is widely
regarded as a vital factor in the state of Nevada’s status as a nucleus of commercial
gaming.
In contrast, the “New Jersey” model pays particular attention to the potential
negatives associated with commercial gaming and places an emphasis on what
differentiates commercial gaming from other businesses. This approach tends to be
accompanied by a more comprehensive and involved function for government.
Ultimately, the “New Jersey” model reflects a societal view that commercial gambling is
potentially a threat to the community but simultaneously is capable of generating
substantial benefits providing the industry is judiciously controlled. For example, when
New Jersey legalized commercial gaming in 1976, the explicit goal was not to build a
new cornerstone state industry but instead to assist in revitalizing a dilapidated resort
community (NGISC, 1999).
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New Jersey was significant in that the original legalization of commercial gaming
was extremely controversial but eventually the existence of casinos in Atlantic City
became largely accepted by the community. The state imposed a rigid and far-reaching
regulatory entity and left few issues beyond state oversight and sanction. Also of note is
the fact that decades after the arguably successful legalization of commercial casino
gaming in Atlantic City, New Jersey has not permitted the industry to expand beyond the
initial base of the resort community.
The riverboat casino states followed the “New Jersey” model (NGISC, 1999). The
riverboat states legalized commercial gaming operations with the objective of generating
economic expansion in a set number of locales. In other words, commercial gaming was
to be restricted to what amounted to enterprise zones created to provide economic
benefits to the surrounding communities. The benefits were the growth in employment
opportunities, capital investment, tax revenue, and enhanced tourism. The rewards and
inherent threats emanating from the legalization of commercial gaming would be
confined to a finite number of locations. The various riverboat states have followed this
approach to varying degrees.
The initial confinement of gambling to riverboats reflected that the states intended to
separate gambling both physically and symbolically from the general community as well
as to emphasize the restricted role gambling was to serve, both with respect to economic
impacts and societal threats.
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Native American Gaming Overview
While not directly addressed in the research, this review would be remiss if it failed to
mention the impact and significance of the tribal gaming model. Significant-scaled
Native American gaming was initiated post 1987 which marked the landmark decision
rendered by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians. The US Supreme Court supported the tribe’s opposition to state regulation by
refuting a state’s ability to regulate commercial gaming in Native American reservations.
The Court’s decision directly resulted in Congress passing the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) the following year. The IGRA served multiple purposes including:
stipulating that revenues from gaming be utilized to further economic development and
the well-being of tribes, and identifying various procedures and requirements.
Additionally, the act declared that Class III gambling, which comprises what is typically
recognized as casino gambling, requires a compact between a tribe and the state within
whose confines they wish to do business (NGISC, 1999).
The United States Supreme Court decision combined with the passing of IGRA that
followed contributed to what can conservatively be characterized as a brisk expansion of
tribal gaming. Revenues from gambling at Native American casinos grew from $212
million in 1988 to $6.7 billion in 1997 (NGISC, 1999). In 2009, the National Indian
Gaming Association reported gross revenues (unadjusted) of $26.2 billion. Currently,
237 Native American tribes are involved with Indian gaming in 28 U.S. states (National
Indian Gaming Association, 2009).
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Illinois Overview
The Midwestern State of Illinois ratified the Riverboat Gambling Act in February of
1990. In so doing, Illinois became the second of the United States to legalize riverboat
gambling, the first state being Iowa.

Additionally, the Riverboat Gambling Act created

the Illinois Gaming Board, which was immediately authorized to award up to 10
commercial casino licenses. Approximately a year and a half later in September of 1991,
the first riverboat in Alton began operation. Illinois awarded all ten of its licenses by
1996 to operators in the subsequent communities: Alton, Aurora, East Dubuque, East St.
Louis, Elgin, Joliet, Metropolis, Peoria, and Rock Island ( Illinois Riverboat, 1990).
Supporters of the legislation believed that riverboats would bring numerous benefits
to the state. These benefits included stimulating the economies of Illinois riverboat
towns, generating tax revenues, promoting job growth, and increasing tourism.
Supporters also recognized that much of Iowa’s already legal riverboat business was
generated from Illinois residents and were interested in keeping those tax revenues in
Illinois (Marbach, 1999).
Five members, appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, comprised the
Illinois Gaming Board. Besides licensing riverboats, the Gaming Board was tasked with
administering the tax collection and the regulatory system for Illinois riverboat casino
operations. Ultimately the Board is responsible for safeguarding the integrity of the
state’s commercial gaming operations in part by conducting criminal and financial
background investigations on applicants for casino licensure.
A gaming license enables each riverboat operator in Illinois to provide up to 1,200
gaming positions. The gaming positions may be comprised of a combination of
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electronic gaming devices and table games. The number of gamblers playing at a
particular riverboat is determined by the number of positions. The positions in Illinois
are comprised in the following manner: positions for electronic device games such as
slots make up 90 percent of the total devices offered, a craps table is considered to have
ten gaming positions, and games using live gaming devices are counted as offering five
gaming positions (Illinois Gaming Board Staff, 2000). Electronic gaming devices
(EGD’s) include as previously mentioned slots but also Video Lottery Terminals (VLT’s)
pull-tab machines and video poker . Although initially the riverboats were obligated to
conduct cruises, by amending the Illinois Gambling Act in 1999, Illinois permitted
operators to remain permanently moored at their docksites (Illinois Riverboat, 1990).
The Illinois Riverboat Gaming Act directly expresses that the legislative intent behind
the legalization of commercial gaming is to assist economic development, to promote
tourism, and to increase revenues available for assisting and supporting education. The
Act also recognizes the importance of providing regulatory provisions to ensure the
credibility and maintenance of public confidence related to gaming operations.
Specifically, the regulatory process is designed to provided oversight of facilities,
persons, associations and practices associated with the operation of commercial gaming
facilities (Illinois Riverboat, 1990). Figure 1 provides an overview of the Illinois Casino
industry with regard to location of riverboats.
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Chicago

Peoria

St. Louis, Mo

1. Grand Victoria (Elgin)
2. Hollywood Casino1 (Aurora)
3. Empress (Joliet)
4. Harrah’s Casino (Joliet)
5. Casino Rock Island (Rock Island)
6. Par-A-Dice Casino (Peoria)
7. Alton Belle (Alton)
8. Casino Queen (E St. Louis)
9. Harrah’s Metropolis Casino

2003 Adjusted Gross Revenue
$380,701,240
$246,866,057
$232,925,884
$269,772,752
$39,493,811
$138,126,316
$109,083,084
$158,033,927
$134,940,409

Figure 1. 2003 Illinois Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted
from Illinois Gaming Board. (2003). 2003 Annual report.
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Iowa Overview
The State of Iowa passed the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act in May of 1983. This is
significant because it lead to the establishment of the five member Racing Commission.
While the Commission initially concerned itself with the licensure and regulation of parimutuel horse and dog racing, the entity eventually evolved into the Iowa Racing and
Gaming Commission whose task it is to administer regulations and laws on pari-mutuel
betting at racetracks and excursion boat gambling along with the other gaming related
venues legal in the State of Iowa (Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, n.d).
Legislation enacted in July of 1989 permitted the Commission to grant excursion boat
licenses to organizations determined to be qualified, providing the approval of the
proposition by a county electorate referendum. During 1989, six referenda produced five
county approvals and one denial, which lead to the commission’s granting of five
excursion riverboat licenses beginning in 1990. This first boat, the Emerald Lady began
operation in Burlington, Ft. Madison and Keokuk on May 10, 1991 (Iowa Racing and
Gaming Commission, n.d.).
Further legislation enacted in March of 1994 resulted in multiple changes to Iowa
riverboat gaming: The $200 a day loss limit and $5 maximum hand wager limit was
removed, the minimum capacity of a riverboat was decreased from 500 to 250 persons,
the requirement that no more than 30% of the vessel be utilized for gambling was
revoked, the prohibition against dockside gambling was eliminated and lastly, riverboats
were able to conduct gambling 24 hours a day. Licensed Iowa riverboats began operation
of unlimited gambling in June, 1994 (Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, n.d.).
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The final meaningful legislation enacted prior to the end of the focus of this research
occurred in May of 2004. Iowa incorporated the moored barge into the redefinition of
what constitutes an “Excursion gambling boat”. This formally removed the requirement
that a gaming riverboat must leave the dock at any time. Furthermore the May legislation
also removed the requirement that a riverboat must reside on a river. Excursion boats
could be located on man-made lakes or reservoirs with only a few additional stipulations.
Finally, in conjunction with the aforementioned regulatory easing, the gaming tax
structure was reworked to the disadvantage of the operators (Iowa Racing and Gaming
Commission, unknown).
A visual representation of the Iowa riverboat market in 2003 is presented in Figure 2.
The location of the operators is indicated by the placement of the dice and a table is
provided that indicates operator names in addition to revenues from that year.
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Sioux City

3

Dubuque
7

4

Iowa

6
9

1
8

2
10

Davenport
5

Omaha, Ne

2003 Adjusted Gross Revenue
1.Harrah’s Casino & Hotel (Council Bluffs)
$111,062.938
2. Ameristar Casino & Hotel (Council Bluffs)
$152,109,549
3. Isle of Capri Marquette
$ 41,697,764
4. Diamond Jo Casino (Dubuque)
$ 53,528,860
5. Catfish Bend Casino (Fort Madison/Burlington) $ 29,047,542
6. Mississippi Belle II (Clinton)
$ 28,228,331
7. Belle of Sioux City (Argosy) (Sioux City)
$ 42,391,801
8. Rhythm City Casino (Davenport)
$ 71,727,957
9. Isle of Capri-Bettendorf
$104,088,011
10 Lakeside Casino (Osceola)
$ 60.419,5698

*
Figure 2. 2003 Iowa Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted
from Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission. (2003). 2003 Annual report.
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Indiana Overview
In 1988, 62% of state voters chose to revoke the ban on gaming from the Indiana
constitution. Riverboat gaming was specifically legalized with the passage of the 1993
Riverboat Gambling Act (PolicyAnalytics, 2006). The Act declares that an owner’s
initial license expires after five years. Subsequently, an analysis is performed to assess
the licensee’s compliance with the initial agreements and compliance to city and county
requirements (Littlepage, Payton, & Atibil, 2004).
The Riverboat Gambling Act directly led to the authorization of 11 riverboats in
1993. Of the 11 excursion boats, five were to be located on the Ohio River, five were
authorized on Lake Michigan, and one riverboat approved on Patoka Lake. By
December 1995, the first Indiana riverboat Aztar opened in Evansville. Five commercial
gaming riverboats opened in 1996. The locations of the riverboats (see Figure 3) are on
the northern and southern extremes of the state. The significance of the regulations
determining locations are that riverboats positioned close to population concentrations
outside of the state should encourage patronage by non-residents. Furthermore,
regulations placing locations distantly from in-state population centers such as
Indianapolis and Fort Wayne serve as a disincentive for in-state patronage. This policy
was adopted with the intention of holding down consumption by Indiana citizens and
thereby mitigating the social costs associated with the gaming industry (PolicyAnalytics,
2006).
In 2002 and 2003, Indiana modified its gaming regulations. In 2002, regulators
decided to allow riverboats to remain at dockside. In 2003, regulations further changed
to allow the restriction limiting ownership from one license to two and operators were
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allowed to stay open 24 hours and seven days a week (Indiana Gaming Commission,
2002).
A visual representation of the Indiana riverboat market in 2003 is presented in Figure
3. The location of the operators is indicated by the placement of the dice and a table is
provided that indicates operator names in addition to revenues from that year.
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East Chicago &
Gary
“Chicagoland Area”

Fort Wayne

Cincinnati, OH

Indianapolis

Evansville

Louisville, KY

1. Argosy (Lawrenceberg)
2. Belterra Casino (Belterra)
3. Blue Chip (Michigan City)
4. Caesar's Indiana Casino (Elizabeth)
5. Casino Aztar (Evansville)
6. Grand Victoria Casino (Rising Sun)
7. Horseshoe Casino (Hammond)
8. Majestic Star 1 (Gary)
9. Majestic Star II Trump(Gary)
10. Resorts East Chicago (Hammond)

2003 CY Adjusted Gross Revenue
(Reported as Total Win by IGC)
$411,069,238
$132,003,822
$221,378,109
$279,305,695
$114,883,387
$141,575,753
$350,761,471
$136,594,710
$134,680,747
$307,610,349

Figure 3. 2003 Indiana Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted
from Indiana Gaming Commission. (2003). 2003 Annual report to the governer.
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Missouri Overview
Riverboat gaming was approved in the State of Missouri in 1993 by means of
constitutional amendment. Missouri’s first commercial gaming riverboat license was
awarded in 1994, this directly lead to the opening of the first Missouri riverboat, the
Aztar in December of 1995.
Missouri legislators changed regulations in Missouri by special session in 2002 in
order to allow riverboats to permanently remain at dockside. The year 2003 brought the
creation of the first land based casino in Missouri. Additionally in 2003, casinos were
permitted to remain open for 24 hours and to operate seven days a week. Finally,
regulations also changed to authorize commercial gaming riverboat owners to hold two
rather than just one license.
The Missouri Gaming Commission’s historical overview of riverboat gaming
mentions that the referendum authorizing riverboat gaming in 1992 expressed that the
intention of the proposal was to increase General Revenue. The referendum further
authorized riverboat excursion gaming on the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.
Additionally, a five hundred dollar loss limit per person per excursion was established
(Missouri Gaming Commission, 1995). The loss limit capped a gamblers buy-in of table
game chips at $500 every two hours (Alm & Star, 2009). The loss limit also applied to
slot machine play.
The $500 dollar loss limited was instituted to protect customers from excessive losses
during a particular excursion. The state recognized as early as 1994 that the loss limit
placed Missouri at a competitive disadvantage when compared to other riverboat states
(Missouri Gaming Commission, 1995). Researchers posited that the removal of the loss
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limit would increase customer volume by 12%, increase gaming revenues by $172
million, and eliminate the inconvenience and costs associated with the boarding card
requirements. The boarding cards were issued when a customer arrived at the location
and were used to monitor the loss limit. Finally, researchers believed that the removal of
loss limits would attract the higher-end gambler that avoided Missouri commercial
gaming locations specifically because of the loss limits and the higher-end gambler had
the potential of contributing $136 million to gaming revenue (McGowan & Islam, 2003).
Missouri voters repealed the loss limit requirement and the changes went into effect
on November 7, 2008. Following the repeal, it was reported that January 2009 gaming
revenues were up 6.3% over the previous year when neighboring states like Iowa and
Illinois both experienced declining revenues. Executives from the casino industry
attributed the increase in admissions and revenues to the regulatory changes (Alm & Star,
2009).
A visual representation of the Missouri riverboat market in 2003 is presented in
Figure 4. The location of the operators is indicated by the placement of the dice and a
table is provided that indicates operator names in addition to revenues from that year.
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St Louis
Kansas City

1. Ameristar (Kansas City)
2. Ameristar (St. Charles)
3. Argosy (Riverside)
4. Aztar (Caruthersville)
5. Harrah’s (Maryland Heights)
6. Harrah’s (North Kansas City)
7. Isle of Capri (Boonville)
8. Isle of Capri (Kansas City)
9. Mark Twain (LaGrange)
10. President Casino on the Admiral
11. St Jo Frontier Casino (St. Joseph)

2003 Adjusted Gross Revenues
$243,416,463
$ 209,781,150
$ 95,640,371
$ 22,229,139
$ 236,562,047
$ 207,873,039
$ 66,209,745
$ 99,271,902
$ 25,057,956
$ 73,443,945
$ 25,642,429

Figure 4. 2003 Missouri Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted
from Missouri Gaming Commission. (2003). 2003 Annual report to the general
assembly.
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Taxation and Regulation of Commercial Casinos
The positive influence of commercial gaming includes among others the regeneration
of tired resort communities, and employee opportunities. Gambling proponents prefer to
emphasize the economic advantages that legalized gaming brings to the surrounding
community. One of these benefits are the enhanced tax revenues (NGISC, 1999).
Furthermore, state and local governments often consider gaming as a way to increase
government revenues by means other than raising existing taxes. The revenues generated
by the gaming industry are often viewed as not directly collected from within the
community (Przybylski & Littlepage, 1997). Another advantage governments rely on
when advocating gaming and the related collection of gaming taxes and fees is that the
community apparently does perceive the taxation related to gambling activities (Borg,
Mason, & Shapiro, 1991).
While gaming has emerged to play an increasingly significant role in state and
regional economies, nowhere is commercial gaming viewed as simply another business.
The implication is that there exists an assumption, of questionable empirically based
merit, suggesting that if left unchecked and without oversight, commercial gaming would
result in a myriad of negative impacts on the surrounding community. Therefore,
government involvement through regulation and taxation is the most suitable solution and
as such, the legalization of commercial gambling has consistently been supplemented
with a regulatory entity charged with the industry’s oversight (NGISC, 1999).
When discussing casino taxation it is of importance to differentiate between
commercial casinos and other forms of regulated gambling. For example, based on a
1987 Supreme Court decision, Native American casinos are not subject to state taxation
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or regulation. It is important to note that although states are not permitted to tax Native
American casinos, many states have entered into informal revenue splitting arrangements
with Native American gaming operators (Anderson, 2005).
Prior research into the commercial gaming industry reveals that states have been far
from consistent in their imposition of fees and taxes on the commercial gaming industry
(Prum & Bybee, 1999). Nevertheless, taxation of commercial casino gaming can
generally be classified into three different forms: Wagering taxes, admissions taxes, and
fees. Researchers have suggested that the gaming industry has relied on the promise of
the potential support these various taxes and fees can provide to the local community. As
such, the tax revenues are often initially earmarked for specific causes.
While a degree of variation exists between states regarding exact definitions, the
wagering or gaming tax is basically a construct of adjusted gross revenues which are
typically referred to as AGR. AGR is calculated by subtracting payouts from gross
gambling receipts. Admission taxes are primarily levied in the riverboat casino states.
If an admission tax is applied, each guest is required to pay the fee upon boarding the
riverboat or entering the casino. In certain states such as Iowa the revenues generated by
admission taxes are divided between the state and the local community. Admission fees
in some riverboat states have varied with the size of the facility or the number of persons
that visited the operator in the previous year.
Various other fees and taxes are required in many states. The most significant with
regard to this research into the riverboat states is the licensing tax. Since Illinois has
limited the number of riverboats to ten, licensing allows an operator to enter into a market
with finite competition from within the state. Limited licenses as well as position limits
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prevent one operator with larger capital reserves to dominate. The final license in Illinois
was awarded to Midwest Gaming in March of 2010. The operator paid $125 million for
Illinois’ only available casino license and thereby received the right to operate a casino in
Des Plaines, Illinois.
Prum and Bybee (1999) noted that simplicity of gaming taxation was advantageous
but less important than the goal of accumulating funds for government purposes. In
addition to simplicity, stability in taxes and fees is of great importance to casino
operators. Increases in taxes and/or fees serves as a disincentive to further investment
and may diminish the returns of an investment (Prum & Bybee, 1999).
Tax Theory
Pygovian tax theory attributed to Pigou (1920) has been utilized by economists to
recognize that indirect taxation can be utilized to counteract injustices inherent in the
allocation of certain resources. The taxes are essentially efforts to counteract for
inefficiencies created when resources are not distributed either equally or fairly.

The

concept is particularly useful if the externalities related to the generator are of the public
good or bad sort and negotiations between the beneficiary and cost bearer is impossible.
For example, commercial gaming in the riveboat states is restricted due to the limited
allotment of gaming licenses. Furthermore, neither the gaming industry nor licensing
entities dispute that legalized commercial gaming results in certain costs to the
community – problem gambling and its impacts. In more simple terms, pigovian taxes
serve to adjust for either positive or negative influences of a particular industry or
business. A tax or a price on the generator of a perceived negative externality should
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reflect the impact that generator inflicts by their production of a product or service on
others (Sandmo, 1975).
Pygovian taxation has also been referred to as “sin taxes” or taxes that attempt to
account for negative externalities related to a business or marketing activity. Gaming has
of course been an industry that has been subject to this form or theory of taxation. The
adoption of a Pygovian taxation policy is alleged to bring various counterproductive
repercussions. Pygovian taxation will certainly lower profits and may result in job and
investment losses, in addition to which the policy may create a climate of moral hazard
for policy makers who simultaneously rely on the pygovian tax revenue while professing
to curb the related behavior or negative consumption.
A distinction is often drawn between Pygovian taxation and what is frequently termed
“sin taxes”. While Pigovian taxation professes to retrieve funds fairly, commensurate
with the damage the industry inflicts, the use of sin taxes in practice rarely is reflective of
any attempt to accurately measure damage or harm. In the case of commercial gaming,
attempts to quantify the costs and benefits have been largely disappointing due to the
complexity of the task ( NGISC, 1999). Commercial gaming’s current tax environment
is to some degree the result of gambling’s history as a “vice” and the related historical
perceptions (Meich, 2008).
Another gaming taxation approach legislatures may conceivably adopt might be
based on optimal taxation theory. This theory reflects an economic methodology that
tries to structure tax policy to serve social welfare most effectively. This goal is achieved
by mitigating deadweight costs. Deadweight costs are defined as economic inefficiencies
produced by taxation. These deadweight costs are related to elasticity of supply and
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demand for a good or service. Legislators setting taxation policy based on an optimal
taxation theory approach would place the highest tax rate on the goods or services that
are characterized by being the most inelastic with respect to demand (Meich, 2008). The
criticisms of optimal taxation are abundant but the primary condemnation is that the
taxation approach is regressive, that is it poses a greater burden on those with less means
(Lundahl & Ndulu, 1996).
Gaming Taxation and Price Elasticity
Various aspects of gaming taxation have been examined by researchers in an attempt
to understand the impact and nature of both the cost and benefit of commercial gaming to
the society. The issue of regressivity was investigated by Suits (1977a). The researcher
used an index of tax progressivity he developed in earlier research (Suits, 1977b). The
index generates a score ranging from a +1 at the extreme end of tax progressivity which
occurs when the entire tax burden is sustained by those of the highest income bracket,
and -1 at the other extreme when the entire tax burden is borne by the members of the
lowest income bracket. Various forms of gambling were examined, including (as
described by Suits): Horses at the track, state lotteries, casino games, numbers, sports
cards, off-track betting parlors, and sports books. Gambling taxes were found in
aggregate to be regressive, scoring a -.25, but there was significant variation among the
various forms of gambling with respect to the regressivity or progressivity score. For
example, Suits (1977a) found that casino games related gambling were actually
progressive (.26) when he examined the U.S. population. In contrast, when Suits (1977a)
focused on Nevada residents exclusively, the researcher found the casino gambling tax to
be profoundly regressive. This trend repeated itself when the researcher focused on
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sports books. Suits suggested that the difference in determining which public income
sector of the carries the tax burden of gaming taxes on casino games and sports books
was attributed to the difficulty and cost for most of the US population to access casinos at
the time of the research. In other words, the cost of travel works to screen out various
income groups which skews attempts to quantify tax burden. The researcher goes on to
suggest that once the casino games are located close to home, poor people are more
attracted to slot machines and table games than wealthier residents of the same area
(Suits, 1977a). Suits was later criticized for using a global format approach; which
examined both gamblers and non-gamblers when reaching his conclusion that travel costs
constituted the primary difference between the regressiveness of the gaming tax when he
compared in-state and out-of-state gamblers (Rivenbark, 1998).
Criticism of the global approach led researchers to measure the tax burden of
commercial casino customers by combining their taxes directly and non-gamblers who
contributed to the tax by the indirect means of traveling to gaming regions (Borg, Mason,
& Shapiro, 1990; Mason, Shapiro, & Borg, 1989). Mason et al. (1989) split visitors into
three distinct groups: Las Vegas residents (Clark County), non-Las Vegas Nevada
residents, and non-Nevada visitors. Using log-linear regression, the researchers
concluded that the gaming tax was most regressive for the individuals who had the
closest distance to casinos. However, in contrast to the Suits’ analysis, Mason et al.
found that the gaming tax was universally regressive regardless of a gambler’s residence.
Rivenbark (1998) assessed the tax incidence of casino gaming in the state of
Mississippi. The study focused on both Mississippi’s counties that hosted casinos as well
as counties that did not offer casino gaming. The researcher utilized log-inear regression
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to discover that although both locations were regressive with respect to gaming taxes,
counties with casino gaming proved to be significantly more regressive than counties
without casinos. Ultimately, the majority of prior investigation into the regressive nature
of casino and lottery taxation confirms that regressivity appears to be an undeniable facet
of any gaming tax.
In contrast, casino gamblers were more likely than non-gamblers to have increased
their savings and to have decreased their debt when surveyed in 2006, in addition to
having higher incomes. Gamblers were significantly more likely to be planning and
setting aside funds for their retirement than non-gamblers (Harrah's, 2006). Harrah’s
surveys from other years offered similar observations.
There exists a measure of disagreement regarding the validity of conducting any
distributional analysis on voluntary taxation (Rivenbark, 1998). Researchers have
defended their research into the incidence of gaming taxation by noting the similarity
between their gaming taxation inquiry and prior investigation into other types of
compulsory or sumptuary excise taxes (Borg et al., 1991; Mikesell & Zorn, 1988;
Rivenbark, 1998). Brinner and Clotlerfelter (1975) objected to the comparison between
gambling taxes and sumptuary excise taxes, suggesting that one form of taxation is
employed to discourage consumption while the other is adopted with the expressed
purpose of generating revenues.
Additionally, differences exist between gaming taxation and compulsory taxation that
are important to note. Gaming operations offer an environment that attempts to induce
unlimited spending compared with a product such as tobacco. Gaming enterprises such
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as lotteries and progressive slot machines offer the promise of the possibility of becoming
“set for life”(Brinner & Clotfelter, 1975; Rivenbark, 1998).
Researchers have commented when examining taxation on state lottery games that
players are only marginally cognizant of the related odds the gaming tax rates associated
with the lottery (Clotfelter & Cook, 1987). While no similar investigation into the
consumer awareness of gaming tax rates or odds of commercial gaming has been
undertaken to the knowledge of this researcher, it is reasonable to suspect that the
understanding or non-awareness of gaming tax rates would be similar and the awareness
of the related odds of play would vary between types of game and between skill level of
player. For example, it is largely impossible for players to know the par of a particular
slot machine but a skilled player can assess the odds of a video poker game accurately
(Kilby, Fox, & Lucas, 2004; Lucas & Kilby, 2008). Par is defined as “the expected value
associated with each slot machine’s pay table” (Lucas & Brandmeir, 2005). That is the
percentage the operator can expect to retain as revenues when payouts are subtracted
from the amount wagered
Suits (1979) also addressed the issue of the elasticity of gaming demand with regard
to gaming taxation. Suits focused on bookmaking in Nevada and pari-mutuel betting. In
both cases, gaming was determined to be price elastic. The bookmakers in Nevada
reduced the take-out rate in response to a drop in the federal tax rate and experience an
accompanied increase in handle from $1.4 to $5 million per quarter. Suits approached
the price elasticity question with regard to pari-mutuel betting by comparing state law
determined take-out rates. Again the researcher found that pari-mutuel betting was
relatively price elastic (Suits, 1979). Suits’ results were further validated in later
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research into gaming demand in the United Kingdom (Anderson, 2005). Researchers
investigated the significant change in the UK’s gambling taxation in October of 2001.
Results indicated that in the United Kingdom demand for bookmaking-related gambling
was profoundly impacted by the rate of gambling taxation. As such, bookmakers
experienced a significant increase in demand for betting when the rate of taxation
declined (Paton, Siegel, & Williams, 2004).
Eadington (1999) found further evidence to support the notion that gamblers are
extremely price sensitive when he compared American roulette with European roulette.
Both forms of the game pay 35 to 1 for single number wagers, however American
roulette offers numbers 1 to 36 along with both a zero and a double zero. In contrast,
European roulette offers the same 1 to 36 numbers but only has a single zero. As a result,
American roulette is precisely twice as expensive to play. This translates into a
significant difference in demand for the game. American roulette in the state of Nevada,
at the time of Eadington’s study, accounted for approximately 8.3% of table game win.
European roulette on the other hand was often the dominant revenue generator among
table games. The game of roulette in the United Kingdom in 1997 accounted for over
60% of table game drop (Eadington, 1999). Incidentally, the contribution of roulette
appears to have remained relatively consistent with Nevada roulette contributing 8.9% to
table game win in 2009 (Nevada State Gaming Control Board, 2010).
The value of Suits’(1979), Paton et al.’s (2004), and Eadington’s (1999) insights into
price elasticity is of limited value to this research for a number of important reasons: The
slot player is not informed of the house advantage of each wager which is the price of
play (Lucas & Kilby 2008). Furthermore researchers discovered that changes to the price
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a gambler pays to play a slot machine or synonymously the machine’s par is not
perceptible to slot players (Lucas & Brandmeier, 2005). Therefore if one were to assume
that an operator changed the par of its slot machines in response to a change in state or
local gaming tax rates, this alteration would not be conveyed to the player by either direct
means such as an explicit verbal or written correspondence or by indirect means such as
the general perception that the slot machines were altered to a higher par.
Ahlgren, Dalbor, and Singh (2009) examined the impact of Illinois’ 2003 gaming tax
increase with respect to its impact on gaming demand. The study used a multiple linear
regression with the period of the 70% tax step represented by a dummy variable to model
the tax rate change. A Box Jenkins model was subsequently used to resolve
autocorrelation issues related to the time series. The researchers discovered that the tax
rate increase resulted in a statistically significant decrease in gaming demand.
Ozurumba and Kim (2009) attempted to determine revenue-maximization tax rates
for states that host commercial casino gaming. The researchers used a Laffer curve to
identify the revenue-maximization rate. This approach is similar to the methodology
Garrett (2009) chose to determine the optimal state tax rate to maximize revenues
generated by state lotteries. The concept underpinning the research was that raising taxes
beyond a certain point reduces annual gaming tax revenue by diminishing the marginal
return on revenue. Ozurumba and Kim (2009) posited that when a tax rate is raised
beyond a certain threshold, operators respond by reducing payoffs, adjusting hours of
operation, and decreasing salaries. The results of the analysis indicated that the
commercial gaming states assessed in the analysis fell into one of four categories: States
that overtaxed but were simultaneously close to revenue-maximizing level, states that
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under-taxed but were close to revenue-maximizing levels, and finally, states that undertaxed. The state of Illinois was the lone state to occupy the first category describe as
“Overtaxing States” (Ozurumba & Kim, 2009).
Monetary policy and fiscal policy are the two main tools of macroeconomic
management. Monetary policy, controlled by the central bank, influences the economy
by setting the money supply. Fiscal policy refers to both government expenditures and
taxation. An aspect of taxation fiscal policy that this research reflects is that taxes or
specifically tax rates are the partial determinants of the prices that both businesses and
individuals are confronted with in markets. It is via this relationship that incentives and
behavior are correlated to tax rates (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1989).
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1989) provided an example of the relationship between
taxation and demand by referencing the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Act included a
provision making equipment more expensive on a relative basis which in turn deterred
businesses from investing in such items. The result of the provision contributed to
decreased business investment and was shown to negatively impact GNP.
Tax Rate Changes Affecting Other Industries
The 1986 Tax Reform Act embodied the most far-reaching revision of the tax code
since its implementation in the 1950s. Among the various areas impacted by the
numerous provisions included in the legislation, the real estate industry was one of the
most affected. The aspects of the real estate industry that were specifically targeted were
depreciation deduction, flow-through tax losses, and marginal tax rates. The value of real
estate as a tax shelter was minimized due to the tax loss offset and the at-risk restrictions
(Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull, 1990).
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The research focus of Sanger et al. (1990) was the effect of both the aforementioned
1986 Tax Reform Act and the 1976 Tax Reform Act on publically traded real estate
firms. The researchers narrowed their attention to the returns of real estate investment
trusts (REITs) and other real estate corporations. The REITs and real estate corporations
were evaluated separately due to differences related to how the two entities are treated for
tax purposes. Sanger et al. utilized intervention analysis which describes the intervention
in a time series via by using dummy variables to both model the tax change and account
for seasonal consequences. The results suggested that the market evaluated the changes
to the taxation of real estate assets related to the 1976 Tax Reform Act as advantageous to
real estate investors. In contrast the market appraised the 1986 Tax Reform Act changes
as having been detrimental to the interests of real estate investors.
Smith and Woodward (1996) also examined the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act
on real estate. However, the focus of their research was the effect the tax changes had
with respect to apartment values. The research utilized a dummy variable to represent the
tax change and furthermore adopted additional dummy variables to model additional
obstacles that threatened their results. For example, the researchers recognized that the
degree of overbuilding in the regions that were examined needed to be controlled for.
Lastly, the researchers acknowledged that autocorrelation was a potential problem due to
the time-series nature of their analysis. Tests affirmed the influence of autocorrelation
and the Parks method was employed to address the issue. The researchers concluded that
the 1986 Tax Reform Act had a negative impact on apartment investments.
Occupancy taxes are funds emitted by a lodging company to a tax collecting authority
such as the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority or various municipalities.
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Occupancy taxes are sourced from a percentage of guest room revenue (Ninemeier,
Perdue, & Ninemeier, 2008). Researchers and stakeholders of the lodging industry have
protested that legislators looking to generate revenues often rely on either implementing
occupancy taxes or increasing their rates due to the relative political safety of such a
change. Since occupancy rates primarily affect travelers who are of course not
constituents of the legislators enacting the rate increases, the assumption is that
politicians will not be punished by their electorate (Hiemstra & Ismail, 1992). Heimstra
and Ismail (1992) analyzed the effects of room taxes on various segments of lodging
operations in the United States. The researchers concluded that the elimination of
occupancy taxes of 9.8 % would result in a 3 % increase in occupancy rates.

In a

follow-up effort the same researchers discovered that most of the room tax is borne by
guests with approximately one dollar out of seven being absorbed by the lodging
industry. The industry is affected due to the reduction in the number of rooms sold
compared to a scenario where the room tax was eliminated (Hiemstra & Ismail, 1993).
Gaming Forecasting
The Illinois Gaming Tax rate increase had the potential to impact both the behavior of
the gaming customer and the various decision makers serving both gaming operators in
the state of Illinois and the competing states of Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri. Similarly,
changes in gaming regulation have been examined for their impact on gaming demand.
Methodologically, the following inquiries have parallels with this dissertation,
furthermore; conceptually the following papers are pertinent to the goals of this analysis.
As previously mentioned, changes in gaming regulation have often occurred
simultaneously with changes in taxation. Additionally, while the directional demand
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impact of regulatory softening and increased gaming taxes might be diametrically
opposed, both changes share an important characteristic. Both events are characterized
by the introduction of a single inflection point into a time series analysis (Eisendrath,
2005).
Nichols (1998b) analyzed the 1991 deregulation of the commercial gaming industry
in Atlantic City. Using an ARIMA model (a Box Jenkins autoregressive moving
average), the researcher assessed the impact of regulatory changes that resulted in
increased operating hours and increases in slot machine proliferation on gaming win.
Incidentally, the author addressed the dilemma involved when attempting to
operationalize gaming demand or gaming volume using casino win. Casino win,
synonymous with gambler losses, is also referred to as gross gaming revenue. Gross
gaming revenue is a problematic measure of gaming volume because it includes monies
that are the result of casino complimentaries (comps); therefore when adding up gross
gaming revenues the casino is counting winnings of its own cash. Nichols argued that
after adjusting for comp ratio (which he calculated as 8.5% of win), casino win was the
preferable dependent variable since it did not include non-gaming revenues that impacted
general revenue options such as EBITDA (Nichols, 1998b).
United States Midwestern riverboat market deregulation was examined by Nichols
(1998a). In a response to the 1994 Illinois’ introduction of less regulated riverboat
gambling, Iowa revamped its 1991 original strict inaugural regulations and eliminated
mandated sailing, loss limits and space restrictions in response to 1994 Illinois’
introduction of less regulated riverboat gambling in 1994. Casino win, total admissions
and win per admission were used as dependent variables for regression analysis to control

40

for the effect of day of the week, seasonality, location, and per capita income while
attempting to evaluate the impact of deregulation. The results indicated that deregulation
had a significant impact on cross-border substitution, by having increased the three
dependent variables: win, win per admission, and admission (Nichols, 1998a). Nichols
work with Iowa and Illinois riverboat deregulation has obvious similarities to this study’s
investigation into the impact of gaming taxation rate changes in Illinois and the resulting
influence on demand in the neighboring states.
Shonkwiler (1993) chose structural time series methodology to examine the effect of
Atlantic City commercial gaming casinos on gaming volume in Nevada. The Shonkwiler
research exemplifies the inclusion of an extraneous event and its impact on time series
data. This dissertation theoretically closely parallels the research presented in this
Shonkwiler study since tax changes in one state are assessed with regard to their impact
in a different state. The researcher advocates his methodological approach by presenting
the efficacy of structural time series modeling of linear trends with the potential for
seasonality. The author found that the legalization of commercial gaming in Atlantic
City reduced Nevada gaming revenues by somewhere between 10 and 12 percent
(Shonkwiler, 1993).
Proximity: Impact of Distance on Demand
Research into the impact of distance on demand for hospitality related services has
been relatively well explored. Earlier research occasionally addressed travel cost, which
typically is a reflection of distance when measuring the impacts on visitor volume or
demand. Silberman and Klock (1986) chose Virginia Beach as a destination and used
regression modeling to estimate the impacts of demographic variables and cost of travel
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on visitor volume. The researchers discovered that cost of travel, (which is a function of
distance (Reece, 2001)), had a statistically significant impact on visitor volume
(Silberman & Klock, 1986).
Reece (2001) examined the effects of demographic, psychographics and distance on
visitors to Las Vegas and Atlantic City. The researcher relied on a censored Tobit
regression technique to measure the impact of the independent variables on the number a
trips households made to his two destinations. In addition the researcher employed a
probit model to assess the probability a household would visit the two locations of
interest. The most consistent finding of the analysis was that distance had a strong
negative effect on visitation.
Travel distance and the related monetary consequence of travel expense are an aspect
of switching cost. Researchers have defined switching costs as related to the effort, the
time, and the expense of changing from doing business with one company to another
(Baloglu, 2002; Bowen & Shoemaker, 1998; Sui & Baloglu, 2003). The same
researchers acknowledge the impact of this attribute on customer behavior. Kneesel,
Baloglu, and Millar (2010) recognized “ease of travel to” as a significant component that
contributed to images of gaming destination when examining implications for branding.
Shoemaker and Zemke (2005) sought to discover and identify the important reasons
driving customer visitation to a particular casino. The researchers asked respondents to
rate various features with regard to their magnitude. Respondents identified the “Easy
drive from where I live” feature as the most meaningful. The study concluded that
operational attributes such as “easy to drive to from where I live” are more important to
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the actual decision-making process of customers than elements typically regarded as
behavior drivers such as promotional materials.
In an effort to determine which attributes impact local slot machine players
repatronage intentions as well what determines a players willingness to recommend a
particular casino, Yi and Busser (2008) surveyed local slot players in Las Vegas. The
researchers relied on regression analyses to reveal that proximity was a factor in both
research questions. The results suggested that proximity increased both the intention of
local slot players to repatriate a particular casino and also increased their willingness to
recommend a particular casino.
Customer Behavior
Prospect theory provides a descriptive model of decision making under risk. The
researchers suggest that when risk enters the decision making equation, people exhibit
reactions inconsistent with the basic rules provided by expected utility theory. In
particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison to
outcomes that are certain. Prospect theory also provides an explanation for the public’s
tendency to discard components in the decision making process that is shared by all
prospects under consideration.
Prospect theory serves as a model for this study because of a number of factors.
This research in part addresses the reasons for changes of gaming demand in the Illinois
riverboat market in relation to the 2003 gaming tax rate increase. The research
hypothesizes that when operators were faced with an elevated taxation schedule, they
decreased their marketing budgets. As a result of this decrease, customers were forced to
pay for parking expenses and the entry fees were no longer comped by the operators. In
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addition, the calculations determining which customers received benefits such as free
buffets became more stringent.
Prospect theory provides a descriptive model of decision making under risk. The
researchers suggest that when risk enters the decision making equation, people exhibit
reactions inconsistent with the basic rules provided by expected utility theory. In
particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison to
outcomes that are certain. Prospect theory also provides an explanation for the public’s
tendency to discard components in the decision making process that is shared by all
prospects under consideration.
The second major contribution prospect theory offers to this particular research is
the concept of isolation effect. The phenomenon of isolation effect is not addressed in
expected utility theory and describes the tendency of individuals to discount components
that are shared by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Expected utility theory is less applicable in the case of this data because it provides no
explanation for why gaming activity began to climb back towards previous levels prior to
when Illinois rescinded the gaming tax increase. Isolation theory provides an
explanation for why when customers, upon discovering that the majority of competing
Illinois riverboats had adopted the same scaled-back comp and promo policies,
discounted the importance of the changes and began to return to their previous behavior.
Disappointment theory described by David Bell (1985) serves to provide some
explanation for why customers model behavior described by Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) certainty and isolation effect. Disappointment is described as an outcome that
does not match up to expectations. The context of an event can impact the perceived
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utility of an outcome. For example the happiness experienced winning the top prize or
$10,000 in a lottery may be greater than winning the lowest prize of $10,000 in a
different drawing. The research also recognizes that a decision maker is willing to part
with a premium paid in monetary or other terms to avoid disappointment.
The concept of equity theory was introduced to the discipline of business and
marketing by way of the inquiry that was grounded in social psychological models of
consumer decision making (Hunt & Kernan, 1991; Oliver & DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver &
Swan, 1989). Conceptually, customers’ reaction to treatment perceived as inequitable
has the potential to produce damaging effects on the well-being of an organization.
Recently, timely research with respect to the economic downturn has been
initiated in an attempt to understand how customer demotion affects customer loyalty.
The term demotion in this context describes the reassignment of a customer to a lower
status that typically results in a loss of benefits. A great deal of research has focused on
the positive aspects of hierarchical loyalty programs and their impacts but little has been
done to attempt to understand what occurs when people lose status in such programs.
Wagner, Hennig-Thurau, and Rudolph (2009) investigated customer demotions and
hypothesized that alterations in customer status provide an asymmetric negative impact
on customer loyalty. A methodology that relied on proprietary sales data validated the
hypothesis and confirmed that loyalty intentions were lower for customers who had been
demoted to a level than was evident for customers who had never achieved a higher
status.
Heskett, Jones, Loveman, Sasser, and Schlesinger (2008) suggested that
customers define value in terms of what a customer receives or experiences weighed
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against what total costs are encountered. Costs can both be the economic price of a
transaction as well as other costs like time lost. While the internal quality, or the feelings
that a company’s employee’s hold towards their position, co-workers, and towards the
operator that they are employed by is the most significant driver of worker satisfaction
and is the first link to the service-profit chain, eventually the customers become the
arbiters of the experience. An important catalyst of employee satisfaction is the ability or
perception of the ability to meet a customer’s needs. In terms of the Illinois riverboat
example presented in this research, customers that expected complimentary privileges
were denied such benefits as free access to boats and no longer received complimentary
tickets to the buffet. This retraction of marketing and promotional spending inevitably
resulted in customer dissatisfaction.
In such a scenario the employees will be the individuals required explain the
policies and attempt to address the situation without the ability to meet the customer’s
need in light of the new policies. The service-profit chain suggests that this scenario is
likely to increase turnover and therefore negatively impact profits (Heskett et al., 2008).
With respect to the subject matter in this dissertation, one could easily imagine that
severe cuts in labor expenses and cuts in the ability to treat guests adequately must result
in a degree of internal disharmony among employees. For example, customer complaints
may increase stress on line employees who are unable to rectify the situation and become
frustrated and therefore treat guests in a poor manner, thereby invoking the wrath of
managers who are brought in as the situation escalates.
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CHAPTER III
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter begins with the presentation of the hypotheses to be tested.
Secondly, the sources and types of data that were analyzed are discussed. Next,
dependent and independent variables are identified along with the statistical methodology
appropriate for analysis. Finally, the chapter ends with a detailed overview of the
assumptions pertaining to the study’s analysis, particularly with regard to the use of time
series data and a description of appropriate methods used to counter violations of the
related assumptions.
The hypotheses are presented in sections beginning with the most significant to
the goals of the analysis. The first section contains hypotheses related to the question of
whether a gaming company in Illinois reacted to the potential of increased gaming taxes
by decreasing marketing/promotional spending. The marketing spending data is
supplied by a commercial gaming company that wishes to remain anonymous but is
described in greater detail later in the chapter.
The second section presents hypotheses related to the investigation of whether the
Illinois Gaming Tax rate change impacted marketing spending of commercial gaming
companies in states that border Illinois. The third section presents hypotheses designed
to analyze whether gaming demand in the states surrounding Illinois was impacted by the
increase in the gaming tax in Illinois and whether distance from the border influenced the
magnitude of such an effect.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: It is hypothesized that the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax
in 2003 caused a negative reaction in marketing spending by a commercial gaming
operator in the state of Illinois. The term “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring”
represents the predictor or independent variable for the gaming tax rate change.
First Primary and Related Hypotheses
The null hypothesis states that there was no difference in marketing spending by
the sponsoring company after the Illinois tax restructuring. The null is expressed by the
equation:

H 0 : Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” => 0
The research hypothesis predicts that there would be a decrease in marketing spending by
the sponsoring company after the Illinois tax restructuring:

H 1 : Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” < 0
Secondary Tests for Trend and Seasonality.
The following independent variables were tested to understand the general direction
of the coin-in response variable and assess whether seasonality was a factor within the
data set. The following hypothesis tests if there was a linear trend to the marketing
spending data:

H 0 : Coefficient of time “t” = 0
H 1 : Coefficient of time “t”  0
The following hypotheses test whether there was seasonality in the data. Dummy
variables representing the months February through December were added to the
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regression model. Only 11 months were represented by the dummy variables since the
twelfth month is the ‘base month’, accounted for by the constant term in the equation.

H 0 : Feb – Dec Coefficients = 0

H 1 : Feb – Dec Coefficients  0
Second Primary and Related Hypotheses
The null hypothesis states that there was no difference or a decrease in marketing
spending or that marketing spending by commercial gaming companies in surrounding
states after the Illinois tax restructuring. The null is expressed by the equation:

H 0 : Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” <= 0
The research hypothesis which predicts that there would be an increase in marketing
spending by commercial gaming companies in surrounding states after the Illinois
Gaming Tax rate restructuring reads as follows:

H 1 : Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” > 0
Secondary Tests for Trend and Seasonality.
The same tests for trend and seasonality employed in the prior procedure were
adopted for the investigation into marketing spending in surrounding states. The model
included variable(s) to model trend and monthly seasonality
Third Primary and Related Hypotheses
To examine whether cross-state casinos’ distance from commercial riverboats in
Illinois impacted demand related to the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring, a
series of analyses was undertaken. Gaming demands for each outstate (Indiana,
Missouri, and Iowa) riverboat was analyzed individually to access each operation’s
reaction to the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate. The null hypothesis states that there was
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no difference in gaming demand after the Illinois tax restructuring or that demand would
decrease. The null is expressed by the equation:

H 0 : Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” <= 0
The research hypothesis which predicts that there was an increase in gaming demand
after the Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring reads as follows:

H 1 : Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” > 0
Again, the same tests for trend and seasonality employed in the prior procedure were
adopted for the investigation into marketing spending in surrounding states.
Subsequently, after determining a coefficient for each riverboat in the three
surrounding states, all coefficients served as the dependent variable in the final model.
The null hypothesis states that distance affected no change in the surrounding states
gaming demand in reaction to the Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring.

H 0 : Coefficient of “Distance from Illinois Riverboat Casino ” = 0
The research hypothesis which predicts that distance affected the surrounding states’
gaming demand after the Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring reads as follows:

H 1 : Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring”  0
Data Collection
Secondary data for this study was compiled from a variety of sources. For the
purpose of the single casino marketing spending analysis, monthly data were provided by
a sponsoring casino with a casino riverboat in the state of Illinois. These data were
sourced from the company’s internal records over a seven year period from January 2000,
through December 2006. The property competes with several other casinos in relative
close proximity. The particular riverboat casino which the study examines primarily
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serves a customer that lives within convenient driving distance to the location and who is
typically referred to as a “local”. Typical of Illinois riverboat commercial gaming
operations, the casino generates over 80% of its adjusted gross revenue from the wagers
of slot players.
Secondary data for the research question exploring whether operators in surrounding
states adjusted their marketing budgets were downloaded from the COMPUSTAT
database which provided promotional allowances from 2002-2006. Promotional
allowances for 2000-2002 were collected directly from the companies SEC 10Q filings.
Promotional allowances were drawn from quarterly filings.
In order to examine whether the gaming tax rate change in Illinois impacted gaming
demand in surrounding states and whether distance was a factor in the magnitude of the
potential effect, secondary data was collected from a variety of sources. Coin-in was
chosen as the variable to represent gaming demand. Coin-in is a gaming term describing
the total amount of monies inserted into a slot machine. An alternative measure
considered was table drop, a term occasionally used by researchers to represent gaming
volume. The disadvantage of measuring demand or gaming volume with a table drop
variable is that it only describes the amount a player purchases at a table and not the
amount wagered (Kilby, Fox, & Lucas, 2004). Although perhaps not commonplace, it is
entirely conceivable a casino patron could purchase $1,000 in chips and put none of them
at risk. Coin-in by contrast represents actual monies wagered and therefore, functions as
a more accurate representation of demand (Eisendrath, Bernhard, Lucas, & Murphy,
2008). Coin-in data were collected from the monthly gaming commissions of the states
that surround Illinois (Iowa, Missouri, and Indiana). The data were collected over a time
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span from January 2000 to December 2006. This public data are available from the each
states commission website and via request from the same entity. Each riverboat docksite
is required by their licensure to provide this information in a timely manner to the state
office of their respective state gaming commission. The information is made public
shortly thereafter.
Linear Regression Models
Simultaneous linear regression, where a single dependent variable or response
variable (Y) and more than one independent or predictor variables (x) is used to fit a
linear equation, will be employed to explore the following research questions:
1. For the first main research question investigating a single Illinois casino’s
marketing spending, we attempted to fit the regression model:
Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug +
β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et
Yt = Marketing Spending by Sponsoring Riverboat Operator
2. In order to analyze the second research question exploring whether operators in
surrounding states adjusted their marketing budgets we fit the regression model:
Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Quarter2 + β3Quarter3 + β4Quarter4 + β570%tax + et
Yt = Promotional Spending by Gaming Companies in Surrounding States in
aggregate
3. The third research question analyzing whether the gaming tax rate change in
Illinois impacted gaming demand in surrounding states and whether distance was
a factor in the magnitude of the potential effect was assessed with the following
models:
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a. Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug
+ β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et
(continued) Yt = Surrounding State (Iowa, Missouri, Indiana) Coin-in
b. Each riverboat operator was analyzed with a simultaneous multiple linear
regression in an effort to generate a coefficient for each casinos reaction to
the gaming tax increase:
i.

Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July
+ β8Aug + β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et
Yt = Individual Outstate Operator Coin-in

c. Distance measures were used to predict changes in the coin-in coefficient
derived from the prior model using the following simple linear regression:
i.

Yt = β0 + β1Distance + et
Yt = Individual outside casino reaction to gaming tax rate change

4. Because the distance approach yielded an unsatisfactory result the approach was
reframed. The revised analysis focused on three separate geographic zones, all of
which bordered Illinois. The casinos in Iowa that border Illinois were assessed as
were the casinos in the “Chicagoland” region of Indiana and finally the analysis
focused on the Missouri riverboats in the St. Louis region.
a. Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug
+ β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et
Yt = Indiana “Chicagoland” Operator Coin-in
b. Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug
+ β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et
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Yt = Iowa Border Operator Coin-in
c. Yt = β0 + β1t + Individual Outstate β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May +
β6June + β7July + β8Aug + β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec +
β1370%tax + et
Yt = Missouri (St. Louis Region) Border Operator Coin-in
In all prior regression models, the unknown parameters were found by minimizing the
error of the sum of squares. The regression equation describes the average value of y
when the independent variables are set at (X1,X2,……..Xn).
A binary or dummy variable was used in multiple equation models to represent the
70% tax level and the overall 2003 Illinois tax restructuring = {1 if period with tax hike,
0 otherwise}. Additionally, the “t” variable represented the trend component which as
previously mentioned assessed whether there was long-term positive or negative
movement in the data over time. The months February- December were treated as
seasonal dummy variables. For example: Feb = {1 if period t is February, 0 otherwise}.
The data and the results of the models was tested for violations to the assumptions of
linear regression modeling such as evidence of nonlinearity or heteroskedascity.
Furthermore all models were assessed for multicollinearity via variance inflation factors
and for autocorrelation. A final assumption is of simultaneous multiple linear regression
modeling is that the error terms are independent and normally distributed with mean 0
and a common unknown variance sigma squared.
In time series regression modeling residuals should be tested for autocorrelation.
Autocorrelation occurs when error terms are not random and positive terms tend to be
followed by positive terms and negative terms tend to be followed by negative terms.
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Without assessing diagnosing autocorrelation, the predictive value of the model is
compromised.
Because of the seasonal nature of hospitality and gaming, it is often necessary to
employ time series modeling to deal with autocorrelation. One method of addressing
seasonality is through the use of dummy variables as described. The main advantage of
including the dummy variable approach is that it results in a regression equation that
visibly reveals the impact of statistically significant seasonal trend, and the impact of the
predictor variable simultaneously. Error terms were assessed graphically for
autocorrelation by analyzing autocorrelation function chart and the partial autocorrelation
chart if warranted. If autocorrelation is a significant factor, then the correct procedure is
to continue the analysis with autoregressive and/or moving-average terms in order to
address the autocorrelation and hence the violation of the assumption that error terms are
independent and normally distributed with mean 0 and a common unknown variance
sigma squared.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Introduction
The following sections provide a detailed description of the results of the analysis of
the data with the methodology presented in the previous chapter. The study investigates
three main areas of inquiry: whether the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax caused
Illinois operators to decrease marketing expenditures, whether the restructuring of the
Illinois Gaming Tax induced operators in surrounding states to increase marketing
expenditures in an effort to draw Illinois gaming customers to cross-state casinos, and
finally whether the Illinois Gaming Tax resulted in an increase in gaming demand in
surrounding states or particular geographic areas within them. The third section can be
viewed as an assessment of cross-state substitution. The chapter will present the analysis
of the three main questions separately.
Illinois Promotional Spending
Presented first, is the analysis of the primary hypothesis investigating whether the
restructuring of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax caused an Illinois commercial gaming
riverboat operator to reduce its marketing spend. Also, in the interest of providing a
detailed account of the analysis, all phases of the investigation are included, with the
initial step being the assessment of the promotional spending as a time series.
Figure 5 describes the marketing expenditures of the contributing Illinois operator
from the years 2000 to 2006. The severe drop depicted in the graph occurs at month 43
and represents July 2003 which is the month the Illinois Gaming Tax was altered. The
graph also suggests different rates of growth or trend prior to the 43 month intervention
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as compared with the growth rate post the 43 month intervention. This graphical
representation supports both the inclusion of an additional trend variable and the
intervention variable at month 43.

2500000
1500000

Marketing Spending in Dollars

Casino Marketing Expense

0

20

40

60

80

Years 2000 to 2006 in monthly increments
Figure 5. Marketing spending of the riverboat operator before and after the 2003 gaming
tax restructuring (month 43) in Illinois.

Table 3 describes the average promotional expense for the contributing riverboat
operator between January 2000 and December 2006. Furthermore, the table includes the
standard deviation as an indication of variance. The data were compiled by the riverboat
operator and supplied directly to the researchers.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Promotional Spending Model
N

Mean

SD

Monthly Promotional
84
$2,361,602
$368,342
Expense
Note. Monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) promotional expense data provided by
anonymous contributing Illinois riverboat operator.
Table 4 summarizes the multiple linear regression, investigating the effect the July
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the promotional spending of a major Illinois
riverboat operator. The regression included dummy variables for the months of the year
which are used to model seasonality, and as is standard when modeling seasonality with a
simultaneous multiple linear regression, one month is omitted and as such serves as the
base month. This study arbitrarily included dummy variables for the months February
through December and omitted the dummy variable for January. Three trend variables:
linear, quadratic, and cubic were utilized to model the time series, as depicted in Figure 5,
along with an additional variable that represented the interaction between the trend and
the tax change. The initial results were analyzed and variables that were not significant at
the .05 alpha level were eliminated, and the remaining variables were regressed on the
Illinois promotional spending dependent variable. The results of that final model are
summarized in Table 5.
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Table 4
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Promotional Spending of an Illinois Riverboat
Operator
Variable
February

B

SE B

P-value

50976

102531

0.621

March

186509

102626

0.074

April

193334

102780

0.064

May

156254

102991

0.134

June

139804

103258

0.180

July

270399

103991

0.011*

August

170899

103471

0.103

91241

103587

0.382

October

116540

103771

0.265

November

162265

104030

0.124

December

174118

104369

0.099

-872334

99982

0.000*

Linear Trend

-79785

79378

0.318

Quadratic Trend

-10461

30231

0.730

Cubic Trend

107666

38177

0.006*

Interaction of Trend
and Tax Increase

574225

140373

0.000*

September

2003 Tax Increase
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Table 5 presents the final predictor variables that were then used for the ARIMA
model. In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance inflation
factors (VIF) of each predictor variable and as such, was not deemed to be an issue.
Table 5
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on
Promotional Spending of Illinois Riverboat Operator
Variable

SE B

t-value

2532273

25086

100.95

0.000

145103

74686

1.94

0.056

1.01

-883407

79432

-11.12

0.000

3.12

Cubic Trend

73716

10742

6.86

0.000

1.01

Interaction of
Trend and
Tax Increase

525562

127917

4.11

0.000

3.13

Intercept
July
2003 Tax
Increase

B

P-value

VIF

Subsequently, the model was assessed for autocorrelation by plotting the residuals on
both the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF)
maps shown in Figure 6. Spikes at lag one on both maps indicated that autocorrelation
was a factor. Autocorrelation was addressed by fitting an ARIMA (0,0,1) with
independent variables. The results of the ARIMA (0,0,1) are presented in Table 6.
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Figure 6. Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from final
regression analysis estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
the promotional spending of an Illinois riverboat operator.
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Table 6
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on
Promotional Spending of Illinois Riverboat Operator
Variable
July
2003 Tax
Increase
Cubic Trend
Interaction of
Trend and Tax
Increase

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

111541.50

54636.76

2.04

0.037

-920094.00

94697.16

-9.72

0.000

74043.95

13118.22

5.64

0.000

647490.60

153304.20

4.22

0.000

0.48

0.08

6.11

0.000

MA1
Note. AIC = 2265.29

The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
promotional spending, found four variables were significant at the .05 alpha level. Cubic
trend was a component of the final model as promotional spending increased by $107,666
on a monthly basis. In addition, July was characterized by a $270,000 increase in
promotional spending. The interaction between trend and the tax increase was also
significant. The results were again assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the
residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the
partial autocorrelation function (PACF) maps shown in Figure 7.
plots confirm that the spikes, at all lags, were not significant.
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The ACF and PACF

Figure 7. Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of ARIMA model
analysis estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
promotional spending of Illinois riverboat operator after fitting an ARIMA model of
(0,0,1).
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Final Illinois Promotional Spending Results
The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 59.5 with df = 4,79 and
p < .001. The model produced an R2 of .75 and an adjusted R2 of .74. The null
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model. Supporting the main
hypothesis, the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a
significant and negative effect on marketing spending by a commercial gaming operator
in the state of Illinois; t = -9.72 with df = 79 and p < .001. The change in the Illinois
Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a $920,094 decrease in promotional spending by
riverboat contributing the data for this study. The moving average (MA) terms appears in
the results of the model and was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects of serial
correlation evident in the error terms. An ARIMA (0,0,1) with independent variables
seemed to provide better ACF/PACF. Next Ljung-Box tests were run on residuals from
the ARIMA (0,0,1) for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value over 20 lags was 0.11 > .05,
hence it was concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA (0,0,1) term
yields residuals that are not auto-correlated.
Cross-State Promotional Spending
Presented in the following section is the analysis of the hypothesis investigating
whether the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 increased the promotional
spending of operators that were located outside of Illinois but were located primarily in
the surrounding states. In the interest of providing a detailed account of the analysis, all
steps of the investigation are included. The initial step was to assess the promotional
spending as a time series.
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Figure 8 describes the quarterly promotional expenditures by Ameristar Casinos from
2000 to 2007. The graph suggests a general growth trend with a possible acceleration
around month 15 which corresponds to the increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax. Both the
trend and the possible acceleration support the inclusion of both the trend variable and an
intervention variable.
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Figure 8. Quarterly promotional spending by Ameristar Casinos (a major riverboat
operator without operations in Illinois) before and after the Illinois 2003 Gaming Tax
restructuring (month 43).
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Table 7 describes the average promotional spending by Ameristar Casinos from the
years 2000 – 2007 as retrieved from Compustat. The high standard deviation suggests
significant variance in the promotional expense during the period observed.
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Promotional Spending Model

Monthly Promotional
Expense

N

Mean

SD

32

$ 3,203,690

$ 1,736,475

Note: Quarterly (2000 – December 2007) Ameristar promotional spending.
Table 8 summarizes the multiple linear regression, investigating the effect of the July
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on the promotional spending by Ameristar, a
major riverboat operator outside of Illinois. The regression model incorporated dummy
variables for the quarters of the year to account for seasonality. As is standard when
modeling seasonality with a multiple linear regression, one quarter is omitted and as
such, serves as the base month. This model arbitrarily included dummy variables for
quarters 2 – 4, and omitted the quarter 1 dummy variable. A trend variable was included
to model the general upward direction of the time series.
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Table 8
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Cross-State Promotional Spending (using
promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy).
Variable

B

SE B

P-value

Intercept

256731

227222

0.269

Quarter 2

-147820

247241

0.555

Quarter 3

-70106

246680

0.779

Quarter 4

-157377

247601

0.531

2003 Tax Increase

634684

195938

0.003*

Trend

173472

9542

0.000*

The initial results were analyzed and all variables that were shown not to be
significant at the .05 alpha level were excluded, and the remaining variables were again
regressed on the Ameristar promotional spending dependent variable. The results of that
final model are summarized in Table 9.
Table 9 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the
ARIMA model. In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance
inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable. Multicollinearity was not deemed to be
an issue.
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Table 9
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Cross-State
Promotional Spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy)
Variable

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

VIF

Intercept

173888

174324

0.997

0.327

2003 Tax
Increase

627470

185956

3.374

0.002

1.01

Trend

172929

9055

19.097

0.000

1.01

Subsequently, the model was assessed for autocorrelation by plotting the residuals on
both the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF)
maps shown in Figure 9. Spikes at lag one on both maps indicated that autocorrelation
was a factor. Autocorrelation was addressed by fitting an ARIMA (0,0,1) with
independent variables. The results of the ARIMA (0,0,1) are presented in Table 10.
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Figure 9. Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from final
regression analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on CrossState promotional spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy).

Finally, the final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation. The residuals
plotted on both autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function (ACF and
PACF respectively) maps, are shown in Figure 9. Spikes at lag one on both maps
indicated that autocorrelation was a factor. Autocorrelation was addressed by fitting an
ARIMA (0,0,1) with independent variables. The results of the ARIMA (0,0,1) are
presented in table 10.
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Table 10
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on
Cross-State Promotional Spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy)
Variable

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

Intercept

220859

203711.60

1.08

0.278

2003 Tax
Increase

434208

215206.30

2.02

0.044

Trend

173844

10507.57

16.54

0.000

MA1

0.55

0.12

4.66

0.000

Note. AIC = 920.83
The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
cross-state promotional spending, found four variables were significant at the .05 alpha
level. Linear trend was a component of the final model as promotional spending
increased by $173,844 on a monthly basis. The results were again assessed for
autocorrelation by assessing the residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both
autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function maps shown in Figure 10.
The ACF and PACF plots confirm that the spikes, at all lags, were not significant.
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Figure 10. Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from
ARIMA model analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
Cross-State Promotional Spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy).
Final Cross-State Promotional Spending Results
The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 196.6 with df =
2,29 and p < .001. The model produced an R2 of .93 and an adjusted R2 of .92. The null
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model. Supporting the main
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hypothesis, the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a
significant and positive effect on cross-state promotional spending by a commercial
gaming company operating outside the state of Illinois; t = 2.02 with df = 29 and p < .05.
The change in the Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a $434,208 increase in
promotional spending by Ameristar. The moving average (MA) terms appears in the
results of the previous models and was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects of
serial correlation evident in the error terms. An ARIMA (0,0,1) with independent
variables, seemed to provide better ACF/PACF plots. Next Ljung-Box tests were run on
residuals from Fit2 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value over 20 lags was 0.06 > .05,
hence it was concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA (0,0,1) term,
yields residuals that are not auto-correlated.
Cross-State Substitution
The analysis of cross-state substitution was divided into four sections. The first
section assessed whether the neighboring state casinos that were close to the Illinois
border, experienced a greater increase in gaming demand than did casinos further from
Illinois. The next three sections examined the impact of the gaming tax on gaming
demand in specific geographic zones that offered commercial gaming on border of the
state of Illinois.
The initial analysis assessed the impact of surrounding state casino distance from
Illinois had on casino demand when Illinois restructured its gaming tax in 2003.
Regressions were run on each casino in Indiana, Missouri, and Illinois by using a dummy
variable to model the impact of the tax restructuring. These regressions generated a
coefficient that represented the impact of the gaming tax restructuring on the coin-in of
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the particular surrounding state casino. Distance measures of each casino to the Illinois
border and to the Chicago area were then taken using Google maps and finally, these
distances were regressed on the coefficients in order to generate a model. Eventually,
this approach was abandoned due to the fact that the model indicated that distance from
both the Illinois border and from Chicago was a poor predictor for change in coin-in.
As such, the analysis was refocused on particular geographic zones that bordered the
state of Illinois. The first zone that was assessed was the “Chicagoland” area (see figure
11) in the northwestern corner of Indiana.
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Indiana’s “Chicagoland” Cluster

Riverboats 7-10 are
Indiana’s “Chicagoland”
casinos

Figure 11. Above image represents the locations of the riverboat casinos licensed in
Indiana and particularly the operators in the “Chicagoland” cluster. This section of the
analysis focuses on boats 7-10 which are located in the northwest corner of the state as
indicated above.

The “Chicagoland” cluster is closest to some of the higher volume Illinois riverboats
that were affected by the highest gaming tax rates, both before and after the 2003
restructuring. Monthly coin-in from each of the four riverboats was aggregated and was
plotted over the time span that began January of 2000, and continued through December
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of 2006. The time series of the “Chicagoland” cluster is plotted below in Figure 12.
Additionally, coin-in was log transformed and a plot of the log transformed coin-in
versus time is also provided.
Figure 12 describes the monthly coin-in as well as the log transformed coin-in as
reported to the Indiana Gaming Commission by the four riverboats in Indiana’s
“Chicagoland” area from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2006. The graph suggests a
general growth trend with peak occurring after month 43 which corresponds to the
increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax. Both the trend and the possible acceleration support
the inclusion of both the trend variable and an intervention variable.
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Figure 12. Graph depicts the coin-in and log of coin-in attributed to Indiana riverboats
operating in the “Chicagoland” area, both prior to and post the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax
restructuring which occurred at time 43.

Table 11 describes the average coin-in for the contributing riverboat operators in
Indiana’s “Chicagoland” area between January 2000 and December 2006. Furthermore,
the table also includes the standard deviation as an indication of variance. The data were
provided by each riverboat operator via the Indiana Gaming Commission’s monthly
reports.
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for Indiana “Chicagoland” Gaming Demand
N

Mean

SD

Empress Horseshoe (7)

84

$ 294,180,739

$ 38,303,751

Majestic Star (8)

84

$ 121,560,602

$ 10,449,906

Majestic Star II (9)

84

$ 117,017,884

$11,820,179

Harrahs (Resorts East) (10)

84

$ 234,958,239

$ 17,820,873

Total “Chicagoland”

84

$ 767,717,464

$ 56,987,507

Note. As reflected by aggregate monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) coin-in data
from the four riverboats that populate Indiana’s “Chicagoland” market.
Table 12 summarizes the multiple linear regression, investigating the effect the July
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the gaming demand at the four Indiana
riverboats operating in the “Chicagoland” area. The regression included dummy
variables for the months of the year which were used to model seasonality. As is
standard when modeling seasonality with a multiple linear regression, one month is
omitted and as such, serves as the base month. This study arbitrarily included dummy
variables for the months February through December and omitted including a dummy
variable for January. A trend variable was utilized in modeling the time series. The
initial results were analyzed and variables that were not significant at the .05 alpha level
were eliminated and the remaining variables were again regressed on the cluster coin-in
variable. The results of that final model are summarized in Table 13.

77

Table 12
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming Demand of Indiana’s “Chicagoland”
Casinos
Variable

B

SE B

P-value

Intercept

20.3795

0.0185288

0.000

February

0.0013

0.0239308

0.103

March

0.1022

0.0239337

0.000

April

0.0348

0.0239386

0.151

May

0.0319

0.0239455

0.187

June

-0.0469

0.0239543

0.054

July

0.0263

0.0239904

0.277

August

0.0281

0.0239777

0.245

September

-0.0186

0.0239924

0.440

October

-0.0200

0.0240089

0.409

November

-0.0548

0.0240275

0.026

December

-0.0496

0.0240479

0.043

2003 Tax Increase

0.0559

0.0114019

0.000

Trend

0.0013

0.0002164

0.000

Table 13 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the
ARIMA model. In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance
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inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable. Multicollinearity was not deemed to be
an issue.
Table 13
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming
Demand (as measured by Coin-in) at Indiana’s “Chicagoland” Casinos
Variable

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

20.39633

0.0108523

1879.44

0.000

March

0.08687

0.0188047

4.62

0.000

1.03

June

-0.0621

0.0187972

-3.30

0.001

1.03

November

-0.0698

0.0188385

-3.70

0.000

1.04

December

-0.0645

0.0188549

-3.42

0.001

1.04

Illinois Tax
Increase

0.05746

0.0118905

4.83

0.000

1.13

Trend

0.00122

0.0002253

5.42

0.000

1.14

Intercept

VIF

The final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation. The residuals were
plotted on both the ACF and the PACF maps shown in Figure 13. Spikes on both maps
indicated that autocorrelation was a factor. Autocorrelation was best addressed by fitting
an ARIMA (2,0,0) with independent variables. The results of the ARIMA (2,0,0) are
presented in Table 14.
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Figure 13. Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of final regression
analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on Indiana
“Chicagoland” riverboat demand.
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Table 14
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on
Gaming Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Indiana’s “Chicagoland”
Casinos that Border Illinois
Variable
Intercept

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

19.51

0.01

1019.67

0.000

0.08

0.02

5.54

0.000

June

-0.08

0.02

-5.40

0.000

November

-0.05

0.02

-3.60

0.000

December

-0.06

0.02

-3.94

0.000

2003 Tax
Increase

0.06

0.01

2.94

0.003

0.0004

3.25

0.001

March

Trend

0.001

AR1

0.30

0.10

2.78

0.005

AR2

0.28

0.02

2.80

0.005

Note. AIC = -285.06

The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
Indiana’s “Chicagoland” gaming demand determined that six variables were significant at
the .05 alpha level. Trend was a component of the final model as gaming demand
increased by a six percent on a monthly basis. In addition, March was characterized by
an eight percent increase in coin-in. Coin-in fell in June, November and December by
between five and eight percent. The impact from the tax restructuring is discussed in the
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next section. The results were again assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the
residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both autocorrelation function and partial
autocorrelation function maps shown in Figure 9. The ACF and PACF plots confirm that
the spikes, at all lags, were not significant.
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Figure 14. Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from the
ARIMA (2,0,0) analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
Indiana “Chicagoland” riverboat demand.
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Final Indiana “Chicagoland” Cross-State Gaming Demand Results
The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 22.5 with df = 6,77
and p < .001. The model produced an R2 of .64 and an adjusted R2 of .61. The null
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model. Supporting the main
hypothesis, the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a
significant and positive effect on gaming demand as measured by coin-in, in the Indiana
“Chicagoland” cluster of riverboat operators, t = 2.94 with df = 77 and p < .005. The
change in the Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a 6 percent increase in
Indiana “Chicagoland” gaming demand. The autoregressive (AR) terms appearing of the
previous models was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects of serial correlation
evident in the error terms. An ARIMA (2,0,0) with independent variables seemed to
provide better ACF/PACF plots. Next Ljung-Box tests were run on the residuals from
Fit1 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value over 20 lags was 0.15 > .05, hence it was
concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA (2,0,0) term yields
residuals that are not auto-correlated.
The Iowa Cluster
The second zone that was assessed was the Iowa cluster of riverboats that all border
the state of Illinois on its western border (see figure 15)
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The Iowa Cluster
4. Diamond Jo Casino (Dubuque)
5. Catfish Bend Casino (Fort
Madison/Burlington)
6. Mississippi Belle II (Clinton)
8. Rhythm City Casino (Davenport)
9. Isle of Capri-Bettendorf

3
7

4

Iowa

6
9

1
8

2
10

5

Figure 15. Above image represents the locations of the riverboat casinos licensed in
Iowa and particularly the operators that border the state of Illinois. This section of the
analysis focuses on boats 4-6, 8 and 9 which are located in the eastern border of Iowa as
indicated above.

The Iowa cluster is comprised of five riverboats that are operated on the border of
Iowa and Illinois. While this area is not typified by the gaming demand that is evident in
the Chicago region of Illinois, the Illinois operators competing with the Iowa riverboats
were still affected by changes related to the 2003 restructuring. Monthly coin-in from the
five riverboats was aggregated and was plotted over the time span that began January of
2000 and continued through December of 2006. The time series of the Iowa cluster is
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plotted in Figure 16. Additionally, coin-in was log transformed and a plot of the log
transformed coin-in versus time is also provided.
Figure 16 describes the monthly coin-in as well as the log transformed coin-in as
reported to the Iowa Gaming Commission by the five riverboats in Indiana’s
“Chicagoland” area from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2006. The graph suggests a
general growth trend with a peak occurring after month 43 which corresponds to the
increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax and then a gradual decline. Both the trend and the
possible acceleration support the inclusion of both the two trend variables and an
intervention variable.
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Figure 16. Iowa Cluster riverboat operator demand as measured by coin-in (y) and by
log transformed coin-in (yl) before and after the 2003 gaming tax restructuring in Illinois
(which occurred at time 43).

Table 15 describes the average coin-in for the Iowa riverboat operators, all bordering
Illinois, between January 2000 and December 2006. Furthermore, the table also includes
the standard deviation as an indication of variance. The data were provided by each
riverboat operator via the Iowa Gaming Commission’s monthly reports.
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Table 15
Descriptive Statistics for Iowa Riverboat Border Cluster Gaming Demand
N

Mean

SD

DiamondJo

84

$ 53,340,432

$ 5,393,260

MSBII

84

$ 29,761,200

$ 2,686,671

Catfish Bend

84

$ 29,001,704

$ 2,208,480

Isle of Capri

84

$ 107,888,420

$ 11,077,743

Rhythm City

84

$ 76,954,508

$ 9,885,175

Total Iowa
84
$ 296,946,246
$ 23,757,825
Riverboat Cluster
Note. As reflected by aggregate monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) coin-in data
from the four riverboats that operate in Iowa and are located on the Iowa/Illinois border.
Table 16 summarizes the multiple linear regression investigating the effect the July
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the gaming demand at the five Iowa riverboats
operating in the area bordering the western perimeter of Illinois. The regression included
dummy variables for the months of the year which were used to model seasonality. As is
standard when modeling seasonality with a simultaneous linear regression, one month is
omitted and as such serves as the base month. This study arbitrarily included dummy
variables for the months February through December and omitted including a dummy
variable for January. After analyzing the results and reassessing the times series, a
second trend variable was added to the time series model in order to achieve a better fit of
a parabolic trend. Both the original trend variable and the squared trend variable were
standardized in order to mitigate the multicollinearity that often occurs with the inclusion
of multiple trend variables. The initial results were analyzed and variables that were not
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significant at the .05 alpha level were eliminated and the remaining variables were again
regressed on the cluster coin-in variable. The results of that final model are summarized
in Table 17.
Table 16
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming Demand of Iowa Casinos that Border
Illinois
Variable

B

SE B

February

8736987

8590952

0.313

March

34742665

8590952

0.000

April

16606201

8592707

0.057

May

21802098

8595164

0.013

June

11971871

8598323

0.168

July

34755487

8611283

0.000

August

31287039

8606739

0.001

September

14610905

8611995

0.094

October

18702231

8617949

0.033

November

4414361

8624597

0.610

December

-3353306

8631940

0.699

2003 Tax Increase

30599425

4092692

0.000

-239927

77676

0.003

Trend
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P-value

Table 17 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the
ARIMA model. In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance
inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable. Multicollinearity was not deemed to be
an issue.
Table 17
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming
Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Iowa Casinos that Border Illinois
Variable

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

VIF

Intercept

19.51

0.01

1710.26

0.000

March

0.09

0.02

4.58

0.000

1.03

May

0.04

0.02

2.25

0.027

1.03

July

0.09

0.02

4.72

0.019

1.04

August

0.07

0.02

3.83

0.019

1.03

2003 Tax
Increase

0.06

0.01

4.21

0.000

1.52

Linear Trend

-0.01

0.01

-2.45

0.017

1.17

Quadratic Trend

-0.04

0.01

-6.24

0.000

1.33

The final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation. The residuals plotted on
both autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function (ACF and PACF
respectively) maps are shown in Figure 17. Spikes on both the ACF and PACF map
indicated that autocorrelation was a factor and was best addressed by fitting an ARIMA
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(1,0,0) with independent variables. The results of the ARIMA (1,0,0) are presented in
Table 18.

Figure 17. Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of final regression
analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on the Iowa cluster
riverboat demand.
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Table 18
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on
Gaming Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Iowa Casinos that Border
Illinois
Variable

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

Intercept

19.51

0.01

1258.85

0.000

March

0.08

0.02

4.58

0.000

May

0.03

0.02

2.25

0.057

July

0.08

0.02

4.72

0.000

August

0.06

0.02

3.83

0.000

2003 Tax
Increase

0.05

0.02

4.21

0.004

Linear Trend

-0.01

0.01

-2.45

0.078

Quadratic Trend

-0.04

0.01

-6.24

0.000

AR1

0.40

0.10

3.83

0.000

Note. AIC = -273.64.
The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring
on Iowa cluster gaming demand determined that seven variables were significant at the
.05 alpha level. Quadratic trend was a component of the final model as gaming demand
decreased by four percent on a monthly basis. In addition, March, May, July and August
were characterized by between a three and eight percent increase in coin-in.

The impact

from the tax restructuring is discussed in the next section. The results were again
assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both
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autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function maps shown in Figure 18.
The ACF and PACF plots confirm that the spikes, at all lags, were not significant.

0.4
-0.2

ACF

1.0

Series fit3$residuals

0

5

10

15

Lag

0.2
-0.2 0.0

Partial ACF

Series fit3$residuals

5

10

15

Lag

Figure 18. Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from the
ARIMA (1,0,0) analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
the Iowa cluster riverboat demand.
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Final Iowa Cross-State Gaming Demand Results
The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 23.7, df = 7,76 and
p < .001. The model produced an R2 of .68 and an adjusted R2 of .66. The null
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model. Supporting the main
hypothesisa, the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a
significant and positive effect on demand or coin-in of Iowa riverboats operating on the
border area of the state of Illinois, t = 4.21 with df = 76 and p < .01. The change in the
Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in an 5% increase in gaming demand at the
five Iowa riverboats operating on the Iowa/Illinois border. The autoregressive (AR) term
appears in the results of the model and was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects
of serial correlation evident in the error terms. An ARIMA(1,0,0) with independent
variables seemed to provide better ACF/PACF. Next, Ljung-Box tests were run on
residuals from Fit2 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-values over 20 lags was 0.11 > .05,
hence it was concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA(1,0,0) term
yields residuals that are not auto-correlated.
The Missouri Cluster
The third zone that was assessed was the Missouri cluster of riverboats that all border
the state of Illinois on its southwestern border (see figure 19)
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Missouri Cluster
2. Ameristar (St. Charles)
5. Harrah’s (Maryland Heights)
10. President Casino on the
Admiral

St Louis

Figure 19. Above image represents the locations of the riverboat casinos licensed in the
St. Louis cluster of Missouri. This section of the analysis focuses on boats 2, 5, &10
which are located in the east central portion of the Missouri which borders Illinois as
indicated above.

The Missouri cluster surrounds St. Louis, and is served by riverboats located in
Illinois and Missouri. The Illinois boats were of course directly affected by the 2003
gaming tax restructuring. Monthly coin-in from the three riverboats was aggregated and
was plotted over the time span that began from January of 2000 and continued through
December of 2006. The time series of the Missouri cluster is plotted below in figure 20.
Additionally, coin-in was log transformed and a plot of the log transformed coin-in
versus time and the square root of time are also provided.
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Figure 20 describes the monthly coin-in as well as the log transformed coin-in as
reported to the Missouri Gaming Commission by the three riverboats both on Missouri’s
Illinois border and located in the St. Louis area from the beginning of 2000 to the end of
2006. The graph suggests a general growth trend.

Figure 20. Missouri Cluster riverboat operator demand as measured by log Missouri
coin-in (y) with time (t) and the square root of time sqrt(t) before and after the 2003
gaming tax restructuring in Illinois (which occurred at time 43 on the upper graph and
after 6 on the bottom graph).
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Table 19 describes the average coin-in for the contributing riverboat operators in
Missouri between January 2000 and December 2006. Furthermore, the table includes the
standard deviation as an indication of variance. The data were provided by each
riverboat operator via the Missouri Gaming Commission’s monthly reports.
Table 19
Descriptive Statistics for Missouri Riverboat Border Cluster Gaming Demand
N

Mean

SD

Ameristar

84

$ 233,877,871

$ 63,938,901

President

84

$ 76,037,552

$ 9,592,105

Harrah’s MH

84

$ 270,796,553

$ 29,730,039

Total Missouri
84
$ 580,711,977
$ 68,649,707
Riverboat Cluster
Note. As reflected by aggregate monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) coin-in data
from the four riverboats that operate in Missouri and are located on the Missouri/Illinois
border.
Table 20 summarizes the multiple linear regression primarily investigating the effect
the July 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the gaming demand for the three
Missouri riverboats operating the border of Illinois and in the St. Louis area. The
regression included dummy variables for the months of the year which are used to model
seasonality. As is standard when modeling seasonality with a multiple linear regression,
one month is omitted and as such serves as the base month. This study arbitrarily
included dummy variables for the months February through December and omitted
including a dummy variable for January. A trend variable was included to model the
time series. The initial results were analyzed and variables that were not significant at the
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.05 alpha level were eliminated and the remaining variables were again regressed on the
cluster coin-in variable. The results of that final model are summarized in Table 21.
Table 20
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming Demand of a Missouri Casinos (as
measured by log transformed Coin-in) that Border Illinois
Variable

B

SE B

P-value

Intercept

19.8333

0.0292821

0.000

February

-0.0077

0.032715

0.815

March

0.0720

0.0327231

0.031

April

0.0389

0.032735

0.239

May

0.0537

0.0327502

0.106

June

0.0109

0.0327684

0.741

July

0.0636

0.0328079

0.057

August

0.0522

0.0328125

0.116

September

0.0092

0.0328381

0.781

October

0.0013

0.0328659

0.970

November

-0.0047

0.0328956

0.886

December

-0.0005

0.0329273

0.987

2003 Tax Increase

0.0431

0.0158776

0.008

Trend

0.0490

0.003443

0.000
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Table 21 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the
ARIMA model. In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance
inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable. Multicollinearity was, as such, not
deemed to be an issue.
Table 21
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming
Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Missouri Casinos that Border
Illinois
Variable

SE B

t-value

P-value

19.85

0.02

929.52

0.000

March

0.05

0.02

2.11

0.035

1.00

2003 Tax
Increase

0.05

0.02

2.87

0.004

1.68

Trend (sqrt)

0.05

0.00

14.03

0.000

1.17

Intercept

B

VIF

The final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation. The residuals plotted on
both ACF and PACF maps are shown in Figure 21. Spikes on both maps indicated that
autocorrelation was a factor. Autocorrelation was best addressed by fitting an ARIMA
(2,0,0) with independent variables. The results of the ARIMA (2,0,0) are presented in
Table 22.
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Figure 21. Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of final regression
analysis to estimate the effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on Missouri
cluster riverboat demand.
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Table 22
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on
Gaming Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Missouri Casinos that
Border Illinois, “The Missouri Cluster”
Variable

B

SE B

t-value

P-value

Intercept

19.85

0.03

616.39

0.000

MA1

0.40

0.09

4.55

0.000

MA2

0.50

0.16

3.14

0.002

March

0.04

0.02

2.04

0.041

2003 Tax
Increase

0.06

0.02

2.42

0.015

Trend (sqt)

0.05

0.01

9.44

0.000

Note. AIC = -244.45.
The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
Missouri cluster gaming demand determined that three variables were significant at the
.05 alpha level. Trend was a component of the final model as gaming demand increased
by five percent on a monthly basis. In addition, March was characterized by a four
percent increase in coin-in. The impact from the tax restructuring is discussed in the next
section. The results were again assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the residuals
from the ARIMA plotted on both autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation
function maps shown in Figure 22. The ACF and PACF plots confirm that the spikes, at
all lags, were not significant.

100

Figure 22. Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from the
ARIMA (0,0,2) analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on
the Missouri cluster riverboat demand.

Final Missouri Cross-State Gaming Demand Results
The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 112.2 with df =
3,80 and p < .001. The model produced an R2 of .81 and an adjusted R2 of .80. The null
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hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model. Supporting the main
hypothesisa, the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a
significant and positive effect on demand or coin-in of Missouri riverboats operating on
the border area of the state of Illinois, t = 2.42 with df = 80 and p < .05. The change in
the Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a six percent increase in coin-in at the
four Missouri riverboats located on the border of Illinois and in the St. Louis area. The
moving average (MA) term appears in the results of the model and was incorporated to
counteract the biasing effects of serial correlation evident in the error terms. An ARIMA
(0,0,2) with independent variables seemed to provide better ACF/PACF plots. Next,
Ljung-Box tests were run on the residuals from Fit2 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value
over 20 lags was 0.61 > .05, hence it was concluded that the time series regression model
with ARIMA (0,0,2) term yields residuals that are not auto-correlated.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This chapter will present the conclusions that can be deduced from the results of the
study and furthermore, it will address the implications of those conclusions. Lastly,
limitations inherent in the research, along with recommendations for future research will
also be discussed. The primary purpose of this research is to provide a better
understanding of the repercussions related to the 2003 gaming restructuring in the state of
Illinois. The research questions are concerned with both operator reactions in and
outside of Illinois as well as changes to customer demand in response to the restructuring
of the aforementioned Illinois Gaming Tax.
The study accesses whether a particular operator in Illinois and a gaming company
whose riverboats are primarily located in the area around Illinois made changes to their
promotional expenditures in response to the 2003 Illinois tax increase and restructuring.
In addition, and as an extension of earlier research into the impact of the 2003 gaming
taxes impact on Illinois riverboat demand, this research assesses the taxes policy’s impact
on surrounding state gaming demand. In other words, did the increase in the Illinois
Gaming Tax result in cross-state substitution? Based on an exhaustive review of the
literature, time-series regression modeling was selected for the analyses.
Findings
The three primary research questions all generated significant results. The first
section of the analysis investigated the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on the
promotional spending of an Illinois riverboat operator. The final model explained 75% of
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the variance in the dependent variables and found that the gaming tax increase resulted in
a $920,094 decrease in monthly promotional spending by the riverboat that contributed
data to this study. The model also suggested that seasonality was a factor in predicting
promotional spending by the riverboat with the month of July bringing an $111,541
increase in the operator’s promotional expenditures. Finally, the model indicated the
presence of a positive trend as well as an interaction between the overall trend and the tax
restructuring.
The second focus of the research was whether the 2003 Gaming Tax restructuring in
Illinois caused operators in surrounding states to inflate their promotional spending in
what may have be an attempt to capture vulnerable business volume from the Illinois
market. The quarterly promotional spending by Ameristar Casinos was chosen as the
best available representation of a casino company with a focus on the geographical area
surrounding Illinois. The final model explained 93% of the variance in the dependent
variables and found that the gaming tax increase resulted in a $434,208 increase in
quarterly promotional spending by the Ameristar Casinos. The model also revealed that
seasonality was not a significant influence but there was an overall positive quarterly
trend of $173,844 in promotional spending by the company.
The third and final component of the study examined whether the implementation of
the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase and restructuring impacted gaming demand in
areas that competed with Illinois for gaming revenues. Coin-in was adopted as a proxy
for demand and three geographic areas in three distinct states that all border Illinois were
analyzed.

104

The “Chicagoland” region located in the northeast corner of Indiana and host to four
riverboats operated by three distinct gaming companies was the first geographic zone
assessed. The final model explained 64% of the variance in the dependent variables and
found that the gaming tax increase resulted in a six percent increase in monthly Indiana
“Chicagoland” gaming demand. The model also suggested that seasonality was a factor
in predicting “Chicagoland” gaming demand. The months of June, November, and
December all had a negative impact on gaming demand or between five and eight
percent, while March contributed to a positive eight percent increase in coin-in. Lastly,
the final model suggested the existence of a very slight overall upward trend in gaming
demand of approximately a tenth of one percent.
In addition to Indiana’s “Chicagoland” region, the analysis focused on gaming
demand at the five Iowa riverboats that operate on the Iowa/Illinois border. This region
produced a model that explained 68% of the variance in the dependent variables and
revealed that the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase and restructuring resulted in a 5
percent increase in monthly gaming demand at the five Iowa riverboats examined.
Seasonality was again a component of the final model with the months of March, May,
July, and August all contributing to a positive increase in coin-in of between three and
eight percent. Finally, the Iowa model indicated the presence of a negative overall trend
that began as a one percent negative trend and accelerated to negative four percent.
The third and final cluster of casinos examined was the three riverboats located in the
St. Louis area on its western border with Illinois. The final model explained 81% of the
variance in the dependent variables and found that the Illinois Gaming Tax increase
resulted in a six percent increase in monthly gaming demand at the three Missouri
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riverboats operating in the St. Louis area. Furthermore, the model indicated that
seasonality was again a component in predicting Missouri coin-in and that the month of
March contributed to a four percent increase in gaming demand. Trend was also shown
to be significant with a positive monthly five percent impact on gaming demand.
Discussion of Findings
The findings were largely supportive of the theories referenced in the literature
section, with the possible exception of Pygovian tax theory. Since no attempt was made,
to the knowledge of this research, by Illinois to quantify either the negative consequences
related to commercial gaming or to quantify the advantage enjoyed by operators in a
limited gaming license environment, one cannot claim that the Illinois gaming tax is
characterizable as Pygovian.
The findings are generally supportive of models based on equity theory both with
regard to the reaction of consumers and gaming managers. The findings suggest that
gaming customers facing decreased promotional perks in Illinois, traveled across the
borders of the state to Iowa, Indiana, and Missouri and spent their gaming dollars there.
Casino managers were also impacted by what might be characterized as in inequitable tax
structure in Illinois decreased marketing spending in the state in order to slow revenues.
The findings also indicated that gaming operators in surrounding states are apt to attempt
to benefit by increasing their promotional budgets in an attempt to further encourage
disgruntled gaming customers to cross into their states and visit their casinos.
Furthermore, the findings are supportive of prospect theory. Prospect theory predicts
that individuals are likely to overweight outcomes that are certain, such as having to pay
for parking or admission, compared to outcomes that are merely probable, such as losing
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to a casino. This explains the customer reaction to the withholding of complimentaries
such as free parking and free admission by Illinois gaming operators in reaction to the tax
increase. The customers are likely aware of a statistical advantage related to slots and
table games that favor the operator, yet the withdrawal of certain outcomes such as a free
buffet resulted in cross-state substitution.
Implications of Findings
The findings of this dissertation present implications for government policy makers,
industry stakeholders, and academics. Academically, this research extends previous
hospitality literature that suggests customers are sensitive to changes in price and
furthermore supports research related to customer disappointment when expectations are
no longer met. In the case of the Illinois riverboats, policy changes related to
complimentary promotions were altered when the state increased its tax demands on
operators. Customers who were accustomed to the being provided with a level of comp
related benefits, that for example, may have provided free buffets or free parking, were
downgraded and received less. The increase in gaming demand in the geographic
clusters of operators surrounding Illinois, suggests that customers took their wallet across
state lines and contributed to the gross gaming revenues and resulting gaming tax receipts
in Iowa, Missouri, and Indiana.
The latter effect provides cause for concern for state governments contemplating
changes to their gaming tax rates. This research suggests that operators will react at least
in part by decreasing their promotional budgets. Government policy makers interested in
maximizing gaming tax receipts may want to further investigate the longer term
repercussions related to increases in gaming taxes. Although this research does not
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formally investigate the rate of recovery from a drop in gaming demand in correlation to
an increase in the state gaming tax (primarily because the Illinois tax increase was
readjusted to earlier levels the following year). The data does suggest that the most
drastic reaction in customer demand happened almost immediately after the policy took
effect and that demand appeared to be trending upwards even prior to the lowering of the
tax rate the following year.
Limitations
The findings of this study must be considered with respect to its limitations. The first
section of the analysis relies on the promotional spending data supplied by as single
Illinois riverboat operator. This is in part a reflection of the inherent difficulty of
obtaining data from commercial gaming operators, who are typically extremely reluctant
to share data outside of their company. Although operators are required to share
revenues with state regulators and though public companies must share certain aggregate
financial data with the Securities and Exchange Commission, monthly promotional data
from a particular operator is only available directly from the source.
Similarly, obtaining data to model promotional spending by gaming companies that
compete with Illinois gaming operators is subject to the same obstacles. Although
companies like Harrahs (now Caesars) operate multiple boats in markets that compete
with this study’s Illinois operator, they do not break down their results or promotional
spending on a boat by boat or a state by state basis at least not for public inspection.
Since the only promotional spending data from Harrahs was aggregate quarterly figures
that reflected their major operations in Las Vegas and New Jersey, including their figures
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with the Ameristar data whose business was primarily centered in the Midwestern market
was deemed imprudent.
A further limitation to this data is the use of coin-in as a proxy for gaming demand.
Coin-in, while generally considered the best representative of gaming demand, does not
constitute the entire revenue equation as it ignores the impact of table game play.
However, the inclusion of table game drop is fraught with its own limitations. Since
coin-in (slots) represents the source of the vast majority of revenues as well as profits for
the Midwestern riverboat market, the decision to focus on the metric in light of the
inherent limitations was made.
Future Research
The replication of the promotional component of this study with additional
contributing operators would lead to a better assessment as to the degree to which these
results are generalizable. Cooperation from an operator that operated riverboats in
Illinois and one or more of the surrounding states during the period analyzed would be
ideal. This would enable the researcher to empirically demonstrate that companies shift
promotional allowances from less lucrative markets to more lucrative markets. It should
be noted that this study attempted to obtain such data but the researcher was denied and
informed that Illinois regulators and government leaders cautioned operators against
attempting to drive customers cross-state to Indiana. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
this cross-state shift in promotional spending is precisely what occurred, but perhaps
understandably, operators to not wish to empirically substantiate their actions for fear of
future retribution from governing authorities.
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With the general proliferation of commercial gaming in both the United States and
internationally, the opportunity to further explore changes in gaming taxation and its
effects both on internal and external demand is increasing. Extending this research into
the Asian market will require adjusting the proxy for demand since the Asian market is
largely reliant on table games for revenues and profits much unlike the Midwestern
riverboat market.
Summary
The examination of the relationship between the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase
and operator promotional spending revealed that casino operators will react to increases
in gaming taxes by reducing spending in other areas. Since the gaming tax rate in Illinois
is incrementally higher as gaming revenue grows, operators are motivated to limit
promotional expenditures that will elevate them into a higher tax rate in the effort to
maximize shareholder value.
In contrast, operators in surrounding states, who are subject to lower gaming tax rates,
appear to increase promotional spending in order to capture gaming revenues from
operators in competing states with less competitive tax structures. Earlier research
indicated that the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase and restructuring had a punitive
effect on gaming demand within the state of Illinois (Ahlgren, Dalbor, and Singh. 2009)
but failed to provide and explanation of the reaction. That is, gaming customers do not
directly experience the changes to a state’s gaming tax structure. The tax is not, for
instance, directly confiscated from their winnings. As such, the earlier research was
lacking in an explanation for the change in customer behavior. By demonstrating that
operators scale back promotional spending which in turn directly impacts the customer
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experience, a link between the tax increase and the change in gaming demand is
established.
The results suggest that the implications of a state’s gaming tax rate increases extend
beyond the state’s borders was further substantiated by the assessment of gaming demand
in three geographical zones which compete with Illinois for gaming revenues. The
increase in gaming demand in all three states that border Illinois is largely a reflection of
the competitive nature of the Midwestern riverboat market. The majority in the
commercial gaming markets have participated in the general easing of gaming
regulations to better position themselves yet appear to be less wary of the impacts of
changes in their gaming tax rates.
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